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ARTICLES
WHEN CHARITABLE GIFTS SOAR ABOVE
TWIN TOWERS: A FEDERAL INCOME TAX
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PUBLICLY
SOLICITED SURPLUS DONATIONS RAISED
FOR A DESIGNATED CHARITABLE PURPOSE*
Johnny Rex Buckles**
INTRODUCTION

The horrifying images perhaps will never cease to visit us. The twin
towers of the colossal World Trade Center collapse in sequence when
airplanes the relative size of sparrows collide with its steely sides in
blasts of fire and smoke. The fall of these monuments of commerce,
terrible and forceful though it was, proved to be the catalyst for an
equally dramatic rise. Literally before the dust from the crumbling
towers could settle, the American people, more generous than ever
before, responded with a deluge of gifts to charitable organizations
soliciting funds to aid those most directly devastated by the dastardly
deeds of September 11, 2001. That fellow Americans decided to help
the immediate victims of that historically grim day was no surprise.
But the magnitude of charitable contributions to donee organizations
raising money to aid victims was nothing short of astounding.'
Copyright © 2003, Johnny Rex Buckles.
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author
gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the University of Houston in the
preparation of this article. The author is indebted to Cabrach Connor, Sarah Oliver,
and Cristina Hendrick Burket for their dedicated research assistance. The author
thanks Professors Evelyn Brody, Michael Olivas and Ira Shepard for valuable
comments to prior drafts of this article.
1. According to The New York Times, approximately $2 billion was donated to
charitable organizations for the purpose of aiding victims. Stephanie Strom, A Nation
Challenged: Charities; Narrowly Drawn Rules Freeze Out Tens of Thousands of
Indirect Victims, Report Says, N.Y. Times, April 23, 2002, at A9. For example, the
American Red Cross reportedly received in excess of $900 million in donations
following September 11. See Editorial, Truth in Charity, Times-Picayune, June 8,
2002, at 6; Red Cross Pitches to Get Specific; Ads to Clarify How Money Will Be Spent,
Wash. Post, June 5, 2002, at B1 (reporting that the American Red Cross raised more
than $967 million for its Liberty Fund); Jon Yates, PrejudiceAlso Claimed Victims in
Sept. lI's Wake, Chi. Tribune, May 5, 2002, at 1. The September 11th Fund has
reportedly collected in excess of $450 million in donations. Id.
*

**
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Donors gave so liberally that the charitable sector, and those
overseeing it, were forced to wrestle with a host of thorny legal issues.
First, charitable donees found themselves puzzled and second-guessed
over how to apply contributions.2 The American Red Cross, for
example, at one time announced plans to set aside millions of dollars
of donations for its Liberty Fund (which was established in response
to the events of September 11) to relieve victims of future terrorist
attacks and to meet general needs.' But the public outcry over this
announcement compelled the organization to reverse this decision4
(which clearly had marred its reputation).'
Faced with such
difficulties, some donee organizations enlisted the office of the New
York Attorney General in devising plans for deploying gifts.'
Moreover, the gravity of concern with respect. to the disposition of
funds donated to charities such as the American Red Cross even
sparked congressional hearings on the use of charitable contributions
made in the wake of September 11. 7 During these hearings, seemingly
everyone wielded an opinion on how charitable donees of gifts
designated for victims should dispose of donated funds. For example,

the

Director

of

Exempt

Organizations

in

the

Tax

Exempt/Government Entities Division of the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") testified before Congress as to the federal income tax
problems presented by this charitable outpouring.' He received sharp
2. See Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, Victims' Funds May Violate U.S.
Tax Law, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 2001, at BI (stating that representatives of charity who
met after the September 11 attacks to determine how to disburse contributions in
accordance with federal income tax laws were "commiserating" and saying, "What
are we going to do?"); Celeste Katz, Fire Union Bows, Frees Tower Funds, N.Y. Daily
News, July 13, 2002, at 10 ("Blasted for sitting on more than $60 million in donations
that flowed in after Sept. 11, the Uniformed Firefighters Association announced plans
yesterday to give out most of the money immediately.").
3. See Martin Kasindorf & Haya El Nasser, Huge Aid Pool Just Adds to 9/11
Turmoil; Charity Disputes, Legal Hurdles and a Tough Choice Compound Pain that
Families Feel, USA Today, Dec. 19, 2001, at DI 0.
4. See Truth in Charity, supra note 1; Kasindorf & El Nasser, supra note 3; Red
Cross Pitches to Get Specific; Ads to Clarify How Money Will Be Spent, supra note 1.
5. See Samantha Levine, Red Crossroads, U.S. News & World Rep., Nov. 19,
2001, at 28 (describing the American Red Cross as "under fire for how it spends
September 11 disaster funds"). The New York Times has described the performance
of the American Red Cross in the relief effort following September 11 as
"disastrous." Stephanie Strom, Red Cross Is Pressed To Open Its Books, N.Y. Times,
June 5, 2002, at B7. Indeed, then American Red Cross President Bernadine Healy
resigned (for various reasons) after the organization faced extensive public criticism
of its handling of donations. See Levine, supra; Kasindorf & El Nasser, supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 2 (stating that the Uniformed Firefighters
Association sought assistance from the charities bureau within the office of the
attorney general in developing a plan for distributing donations).
7. See Hearing on Response by Charitable Organizations to the Recent Terrorist
Attacks Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
107th Cong. (2001).
8. Id.(statement of Steven Miller, Director, Exempt Organizations, Tax
Exempt/Government Entities Division, Internal Revenue Service).
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criticism, however, for too narrowly interpreting the range of activities
that a tax-exempt charity can perform without jeopardizing its
exemption from federal income taxation.9 It soon became clear to
Congress that existing law provided no solution sufficient to satisfy
the perceived expectations of the donating public, on the one hand,
and the limitations governing charitable donees on the use of donated
funds, on the other. Thus, Congress promptly enacted special income
tax legislation responding to the events of September 11, which the
President signed into law."° This legislation was designed in part to
allay certain federal income tax concerns of charitable donees in
receipt of vast sums of restricted funds."
Although the charitable reaction to the events of September 11 is
an extreme example of the receipt by charities of more money than
they may deem necessary to fulfill a specified charitable purpose, it is
not an isolated phenomenon. A review of case reports reveals that
charitable organizations frequently solicit money from the general
public for a specified charitable purpose, and later sometimes find that
they have received more funds than necessary to accomplish that
purpose.1" What is a charity to do under these circumstances?
Charities cannot sensibly hope for an act of Congress every time an
unusual turn of events results in their receipt of surplus funds solicited
for a designated charitable purpose. A more comprehensive legal
solution to this problem is necessary.
Deriving this solution obviously requires a thorough understanding
of the legal landscape involving surplus funds donated for a particular
charitable purpose. In developing this understanding, one must
ponder several questions. Does the law limit the options available to
a charity that receives excess funds in response to an appeal
identifying a particular charitable need, and if so, how? Do any
limitations on the disposition of surplus funds pose difficulties for
charitable donees and donors, or on the courts that must resolve the
problems associated with surplus funds? Do current reform proposals
adequately address any problems identified in this analysis? Is there a
better way to reform existing law to improve the disposition of surplus
9. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Was the IRS Reversal on Charity Necessary?, 93
Tax Notes 1138 (2001) (criticizing the original position articulated by the IRS in the
congressional hearings on the use of charitable contributions made in response to the
events of September 11 as "exceedingly narrow").
10. See Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115
Stat. 2427 (2002).
11. The legislation provides that payments made by organizations described in
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code by reason of the death, injury,
wounding or illness of any person resulting from the terrorist attacks of September 11
(or the subsequent anthrax attacks) "shall be treated as related to the purpose or
function constituting the basis for such organization's exemption" in specified
circumstances. Id. § 104. Such payments must be "made in good faith using a
reasonable and objective formula which is consistently applied." Id.
12. See infra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
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funds restricted for a particular charitable purpose? This article
analyzes these difficult issues and proposes a federal solution to the
numerous problems raised.
Part I discusses and analyzes the legal problems associated with a
charitable organization's receipt of excess funds resulting from a
public appeal for donations to accomplish a particular charitable
purpose. Part L.A surveys the relevant issues raised strictly under
state law, including the general legal consequences of accepting
restricted gifts, and the legal implications of receiving restricted funds
when it becomes impossible to accomplish the restricted purposes for
which the gifts were made. Part .B discusses two areas of federal
income tax law that must be understood in conducting a thorough
analysis under state law of the effect of receiving excess donations
from the general public. The first area involves the legal requirements
that a charitable entity must satisfy in maintaining its exemption from
federal income taxation. The second area involves the element of
"finality" that must largely characterize a charitable contribution for
which a deduction is claimed.
Part II discusses and analyzes four prominent proposals offered by
scholars for reforming the doctrine of cy pres, the most important
doctrine of state law governing restricted charitable gifts. Each
reform proposal is briefly discussed and then critically examined in
the context of publicly solicited gifts restricted for a designated
Part II identifies potential advantages and
charitable purpose.
disadvantages of each proposal, and concludes that no single proposal
adequately addresses the unique issues presented under state law and
federal income tax law in the context of publicly solicited gifts.
Part III advances an original solution to the problems identified in
prior sections of this article. Part III.A briefly identifies the criteria
that should characterize any proposal for solving the problem of
surplus restricted funds raised through mass appeals by charity. Part
III.B then explains and justifies my proposal: amending the Internal
Revenue Code to include a new section 170(f)(11). The text of my
proposed statutory addition is reproduced in Appendix A. Part III.B
discusses the major elements of the proposed amendment, and
explains why the proposal survives scrutiny under the criteria
identified in Part III.A. I then summarize this article in Part IV.

2003]
I.

CHARITABLE GIFTS

1831

LEGAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH EXCESS CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS

A. State Law Considerations
1. General Consequences of Restricted Gifts Under State Law
If a charitable organization accepts a gift pursuant to an instrument
(such as a last will and testament or deed of gift) by which the donor
restricts the donee's use of gifted funds, the restriction is generally
legally binding on the charity, even if under state law the restriction
does not give rise to a trust. 13 The state attorney general can sue the
charity to enforce the terms of the restriction imposed by the
instrument of gift. 4 Indeed, in many circumstances, the attorney
general is the sole enforcer of the terms of a charitable gift. Courts
often state that as a general rule, a donor has no standing to enforce
the terms of a charitable gift, whether given in trust or outright to a
corporate charity. 5 A contributor will be granted such standing only
13. See, e.g., St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 22 N.E.2d 305, 306, 308 (N.Y. 1939); In
re Pelton's Will, 74 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747 (Surr. Ct. 1947) (holding a restricted bequest to
a charitable hospital enforceable); see 15 Am. Jur. 2d Charities § 4 (2002) (stating that
a direct gift to a charitable donee "will result in its firm and unalterable dedication" to
the donee's purposes, or "to such of the organization's purposes as are specified"); 4A
Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts § 348.1 (4th ed. 1989)
[hereinafter Scott] (stating that the weight of judicial authority upholds restrictions on
gifts to charitable corporations).
14. See Herzog Found. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 997-98 (Conn. 1997);
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 348 cmt. f (1959); Scott, supra note 13, § 348.1.
15. See, e.g., Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 998 (noting that at common law, a donor
who has made a completed charitable contribution, whether as an absolute gift or in
trust, had no standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of her gift or trust unless
she expressly reserved the right to do so); Warren v. Bd. of Regents, 544 S.E.2d 190,
192-94 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs' transfer in trust did not confer
standing on them); Smith v. Thompson, 266 Il1. App. 165, 169 (11. App. Ct. 1932)
(stating that "neither the donor nor his heirs have any standing in court in a
proceeding to compel proper execution of the trust"); Baltimore Arts Festival v.
Baltimore, 607 A.2d 1, 4 (Md. 1992) (stating that in the absence of an express
reservation of rights, a donor may not sue); Hagaman v. Bd. of Educ., 285 A.2d 63, 67
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1971) (stating that the heirs of a settlor generally cannot enforce a
charitable trust); Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1967) (stating that the general rule denying standing to donors "is as
applicable to the law of charitable corporations as to the law of charitable trusts");
Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 281 A.D.2d 127, 145 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001) (Friedman, J., dissenting) (noting that "a limited standing rule is necessary to
protect charitable institutions from 'vexatious litigation"') (citing Alco Gravure v.
Knapp Found., 64 N.Y.2d 458, 466 (N.Y. 1985)); McFarland v. Atkins, 594 P.2d 758
(Okla. 1978) (holding that a mere contributor to a charitable fund does not generally
have standing unless he has some special interest in the trust, or a reversionary
interest in the fund different from that of his fellow contributors); 15 Am. Jur. 2d
Charities § 141 (2002) (stating that donors to a broadly supported charitable fund
cannot hold trustees accountable for breach of trust without having some special
interest in the fund distinct from the interests of fellow contributors); Scott,

1832

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

if she has some special interest in the fund. 6 Precisely what type of
special interest a donor must retain in order to have standing to
enforce the terms of a restricted gift is not clear.17 The theory behind
the general rule is that charitable funds are held for the public, and
enforcement on behalf of the public rests in the state attorneys
general.1" If the donor lacks any reversionary or other special interest,
a donor's interest in enforcing the terms of the gift is purportedly no
greater than that of the representative of the general public (the
attorney general). Although this general rule has been subject to
some judicial erosion19 and a great deal of scholarly discussion, it
remains the prevailing view of the courts."
supra note 13, § 367.2 (stating that subscribers to a charitable trust cannot sue to
modify the purposes of the trust). At least one court, however, has suggested in dicta
that a donor may have a right to sue for reimbursement of contributions to a relief
fund. See, e.g., Victims v. Funds, Third Parties, and Reeves County, Tex., 715 F.
Supp. 178, 181 (W.D. Tex. 1989). See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of
the CharitableDollar.An Unfulfilled State Responsibility,73 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 445-49
(1960) (discussing enforcement of charitable trusts by donors and founders).
16. See Paterson, 235 A.2d at 495 (citation omitted); George G. Bogert et al., The
Law of Trusts and Trustees § 411 (Rev. 2d ed. 1991).
17. Some authorities suggest that such an interest exists not only when the donor
explicitly retains a reversionary interest in the gift, but also when she expressly retains
the right to redirect the gift for other charitable purposes. See, e.g., Herzog Found.,
699 A.2d at 997. That a special interest sufficient to confer standing includes a right
to redirect a charitable gift finds support in the monumental work of the late
Professor Austin W. Scott of the Harvard Law School. According to Professor Scott,
a settlor of a charitable trust has no power to compel or permit a deviation from trust
terms, unless she has reserved the power to modify the trust. See Scott, supra note 13, §
367.2 (emphasis added). The power to redirect a restricted charitable gift is
essentially the power to modify the terms of the gift. To confer standing on a donor
to compel a deviation from trust terms, but to deny standing when a donor seeks to
compel compliance with trust terms, would seem senseless.
18. See 15 Am. Jur. 2d Charities § 141 (2002).
19. A recent case that defies the conventional rule is Smithers v. St. Luke'sRoosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 281 A.D.2d 127, affd, 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
In that case, a recovered alcoholic donated $10 million to St. Luke's-Roosevelt
Hospital Center for the establishment of an alcoholism treatment center. Under the
terms of gift, the hospital would expand its treatment of alcoholism to include,
following five days of detoxification in the hospital, rehabilitation in a therapeutic
community located away from the hospital itself. With an initial $1 million
installment of the gift, the hospital purchased a building in Manhattan to house the
rehabilitation program. The donor died twenty years later, and shortly thereafter the
hospital announced plans to move the center into a hospital ward and sell the
building. The donor's widow, unsuccessful in her attempts to persuade the hospital to
honor the terms of the gift, sued to enjoin the hospital from disbursing the proceeds
from the sale of the building and relocating the center. The court held that the
express retention of rights was not necessary to confer standing on the donor's widow
because the donor, "as the founder of the charity, has standing to appear in court to
restrain the diversion of the property donated from the charitable uses for which it
was given." Id. at 137 (quoting Mills v. Davison, 35 A. 1072, 1075 (N.J. 1896)). The
court reasoned that "[t]he donor of a charitable gift is in a better position than the
Attorney General to be vigilant and, if he or she is so inclined, to enforce his or her
own intent." Id. at 139.
20. Some commentators have called for a change to the broad rule against donor
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That restrictions on charitable gifts imposed by donors are generally
enforceable must not be overlooked. In the following section, this
article discusses an important doctrine that limits the extent to which
the terms of a charitable gift will be enforced. The vast attention
devoted to this doctrine in this article should not be read to mask the
general rule of the enforcement of restricted charitable gifts. 21
Likewise, that donors are usually denied standing to enforce the terms
of charitable gifts must not be understood to mean that charities may
disregard restrictions imposed by charitable donors. Donor-imposed
restrictions on charitable transfers are legally binding on charities, and
therefore they normally must comply with such restrictions upon
accepting a restricted gift.2 2 Admittedly, the limited resources of the
state attorneys general, coupled with the need to combat charitable
abuses that are often more serious than diverting contributions from a
specified charitable purpose to another charitable end, lead to a
practical problem of enforcing restricted gifts to charity. 23 The
presence of this practical problem of enforcement, however, does not
vitiate the legally binding effect of restricted charitable gifts, nor does
it. necessarily nullify the theoretical justifications for honoring donorimposed restrictions.
2. When Restricted Purposes Cannot Be Fulfilled
Notwithstanding that restricted gifts are generally enforceable, if
the restricted purpose of the gift can no longer be fulfilled, a court
must be petitioned2 4 to determine the disposition of the funds. The
enforcement. See, e.g., John T. Gaubatz, GrantorEnforcement of Trusts: Standing in
One Private Law Setting, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 905 (1984) (arguing that the blanket rule is
too broad and donor standing should be permitted in certain situations); see also
Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations,
1999 Wis. L. Rev. 227 (1999) (suggesting the creation of private, for-profit monitoring
companies to ensure donor intent is fulfilled or a solution based on contract law). On
the other hand, courts and commentators have justified the denial of standing to
donors on the grounds that allowing suits by small donors would create the potential
for too many frivolous actions. See, e.g., In re De Long, 565 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (App.
Div. 1991) (citations omitted); Karst, supra note 15, at 445-47.
21. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
22. Id.
23. See Lisa Loftin, Note, Protecting the Charitable Investor: A Rationale for
Donor Enforcement of Restricted Gifts, 8 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 361, 382-84 (1999); cf.
Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-ProfitOrganizationalForms, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457, 467 n.32
(1996) (citing authorities discussing the limited ability of state attorneys general to
oversee charitable organizations); Karst, supra note 15, at 451-52 (discussing the lack
of information available to state attorneys general); Manne, supra note 20, at 250-51
(discussing the inadequacy of enforcement of charitable obligations by state attorneys
general on account of lack of resources and selective prosecution).
24. Although the trustees of a charitable trust normally petition the court for the
application of cy pres, the state attorney general, and in some cases persons with an
interest in the trust, can also do so. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399 cint. f
(1959). According to the Restatement, unless either the donor has reserved a power
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courts in most jurisdictions will be guided by the doctrine of cy pres."
Understanding this doctrine is essential to an informed understanding
of the legal options available for directing the disposition of surplus
charitable gifts received through public solicitations. This section of
the article summarizes the doctrine of cy pres, reviews its applicability
to gifts to charitable corporations, and discusses its relevance in the
context of mass solicitations for charitable donations.
a. The Doctrine of Cy Pres
Under the doctrine of cy pres,26 a court may direct the application
of charitable trust funds to purposes similar to the original trust
purposes27 when accomplishing the latter is or becomes impossible,
impracticable, or illegal, provided that the transferor of the funds has
manifested an intent to devote the funds to charitable purposes more
general than the frustrated specific purpose of the gift.2" The court
of modification or a state statute otherwise provides, a donor's consent is not required
for applying cy pres. See id.§ 399 cmt. g.
25. "Cy pres" is an abbreviated expression for the expanded "cy pres comme
possible," which is Norman French for "as near as possible." See Bogert, supra note
16, § 431, at 95. The cy pres power may be exercised by the courts "in a great
majority of the states," either through their equitable jurisdiction or by state statute.
Id. § 433, at 113; see also Scott, supra note 13, § 399.2, at 490 ("In the great majority of
states the cy pres doctrine has been accepted."). For an outstanding doctrinal
discussion of cy pres, see Domenic P. Aiello & Tracy Adler Craig, Cy Pres:
Reformation of the CharitableTrust, 81 Mass. L. Rev. 110 (1996).
26. Closely related to the doctrine of cy pres is the doctrine of deviation (or
"equitable deviation"). Under this latter doctrine, a court may direct or authorize a
trustee of a charitable trust to deviate from the administrative terms of trust if
compliance with the original terms is impossible or illegal, or if compliance with the
terms of trust would substantially impede the accomplishment of trust purposes on
account of circumstances that the settlor did not foresee. See Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 381 & cmt. a (1959); see, e.g., MacCurdy-Salisbury Educ. Fund v. Killian, 309
A.2d 11, 13-14 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973) (applying the doctrine of deviation to
minimize adverse federal excise tax consequences of accumulating trust income;
distinguishing the doctrine of deviation from the doctrine of cy pres). Whereas the
doctrine of deviation purports to extend only to administrative terms of trust, the
doctrine of cy pres results in deviating from the very purposes of a trust. See
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, supra, § 381 cmt. a. As one would expect,
distinguishing between "administrative terms" and terms governing trust "purposes"
is a difficult, if not illusory, judicial enterprise. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting
Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine,
21 U. Haw. L. Rev. 353, 375-76, 380 (1999); Roger G. Sisson, Relaxing the Dead
Hand's Grip: Charitable Efficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 Va. L. Rev. 635,
648 (1988).
27. Although courts sometimes state that cy pres requires them to apply a failed
charitable gift as nearly as possible to the original purposes, courts increasingly "seek.
. . to frame a scheme which on the whole is best suited to accomplish the general
charitable purpose of the donor," even if the court's disposition of funds is not
necessarily as similar to the donor's design as that which is theoretically possible.
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399 cmt. b (1959).
28. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399 (1959); see, e.g., Sharpless v.
Medford Monthly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends, 548 A.2d 1157, 1160
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will hear evidence of how the donor, at the time of making the gift,
probably would have preferred the funds to be distributed had she
known that the original trust purpose would fail.29
In those states that do not recognize the cy pres doctrine, or when
the doctrine, though recognized under state law, is not applied in a
particular case, the failure of a charitable trust creates a resulting trust
for the settlor or her successors. In other words, in such instances,
the person who executes a charitable transfer in trust has a
reversionary interest in trust property, which becomes a private
possessory interest when the original purposes of the charitable trust
have failed.
In those states that recognize the cy pres doctrine, if property is
conveyed for a particular charitable purpose which thereafter is
accomplished in full, any remaining funds may be applied cy pres,
provided that the settlor manifested general charitable intent.31 This
instance of cy pres is sometimes understood as merely one type of
"impossibility" of fulfilling the original trust purposes.32 Cy pres may
be applied not only in the case of surplus principal from
contributions, 33 but also when income from contributions comprising a
permanent fund exceeds that amount which is necessary to accomplish
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); cf Bogert, supra note 16, § 438 (stating that the
doctrine applies when, in relevant part, furthering the donor's specific intent "is or
becomes impossible, impractical, or inexpedient"); Scott, supra note 13, § 399.2
(stating that cy pres may be applied when "it is impossible or impracticable" to carry
out the settlor's particular charitable purposes).
The doctrine is sometimes
articulated as involving three prongs: (i) property is gratuitously transferred in trust
for a designated charitable purpose; (ii) carrying out the designated purposes of the
gift is, or becomes, impossible, impracticable, or illegal; and (iii) the trustor
manifested a general intention to devote the gifted property to charitable purposes.
See 15 Am. Jur. 2d Charities § 149 (2002). See generally Scott, supra note 13, § 399
(discussing the cy pres doctrine).
29. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399 cmt. d (1959) (stating that a court
will hear circumstantial evidence bearing on the donor's intent, in addition to the
terms of the gift instrument).
30. See Bogert, supra note 16, § 433, at 125; see, e.g., Rohlff v. German Old
People's Home, 10 N.W.2d 686, 690-93 (Neb. 1943) (finding no general charitable
intent when the testator's will provided for a gift to create a home for elderly
Germans in Omaha; stating that the failure of the trust results in a reversion of the
funds).
31. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 400 (1959); 15 Am. Jur. 2d Charities §
162 (2002). If the donor or settlor lacked general charitable intent, surplus funds will
revert to the donor or her heirs. See Holmes v. Welch, 49 N.E.2d 461, 463-64 (Mass.
1943); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 400 cmt. b (1959); 15 Am. Jur. 2d Charities §
147 (2002).
32. Lionel Astor Sheridan & Vincent Thomas Hyginus Delany, The Cy Pres
Doctrine 33 (1st ed. 1959).
33. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399 cmt. k (1959) (stating that property
given in trust for a purpose that is subsequently accomplished may be subject to cy
pres); see, e.g., Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867) (applying cy pres to
a trust fund established to influence the public to oppose the slavery of AfricanAmericans when such purpose was rendered obsolete by the abolition of slavery).
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the specified purposes of the fund.34 Thus, in Sharpless v. Medford
Monthly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends,35 the court was
faced with deciding whether a portion of the income from funds held
for the benefit of a local church for the maintenance of its cemeteries
could be used for more general church purposes, when the fund
consistently generated income in excess of cemetery-related expenses.
The court concluded that the doctrine of cy pres applied to the excess
income.36 The court considered the case before it as one of
impossibility, because "there is an impossibility of using the excess
income to advance the particular charitable purpose expressed by the
donors."3
The more difficult issue was whether the donors who
contributed to the fund had manifested general charitable intent
beyond the specific desire to maintain grave sites." The court inferred
general charitable intent by reasoning that the donors logically would
expect excess income to be used to support the institution (the
church) which was expected to maintain the cemetery in the future.39
In other words, the donors could not have intended for the cemetery
fund to grow while the existence of the church itself became
threatened by lack of adequate funding."'
Except in states which have statutorily modified the common-law
rule, courts recognizing the cy pres doctrine will apply it only if the
settlor had a general or broad charitable intent (i.e., an intent to
further charity in general, rather than an intent to further charity
exclusively through the means specified in the trust instrument).4 The
mere fact that a donor describes the charitable purpose of the gift with
particularity, even if she states that the gift is to be used for no other
purpose, does not necessarily establish the absence of general
charitable intent.42 Similarly, a donor's narrow description of the
charitable class to benefit from her gift does not preclude a finding of
general charitable intent.43 A donor will be found to have possessed
34. See Bogert, supra note 16, § 438; Scott, supra note 13, § 400; see, e.g., Estate of
Puckett v. Bank of America, 111Cal. App. 3d 46, 52-53 (Ct. App. 1980) (applying cy
pres to excess income of scholarship fund).
35. 548 A.2d 1157 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1988).
36. See id. at 1160.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. See Bogert, supra note 16, § 436. The requirement that a settlor have general
charitable intent has been insightfully criticized. Id.
42. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399 cmt. c (1959). The Restatement,
however, also states that cy pres does not apply if "the charitable purpose is confined
to a particular project, objective, or institution." See Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 153 (1959). Presumably, whether the charitable purpose is "confined" (within the
meaning of section 153 of the Restatement) to the specific purpose is an issue that the
court must decide.
43. See Gallaudet Univ. v.Nat'l Soc'y Daughters Am. Revolution, 699 A.2d 531,
550 n.19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
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general charitable intent if a court determines that the donor, had she
known that following the express terms of the gift would be
impossible, would prefer that the gift be employed for a similar
charitable purpose, rather than that the gift revert to the donor or her
estate.4 4 If the donor's intent is not apparent from the terms of the
instrument of gift, her general charitable intent may still be inferred
from circumstantial evidence. 45 As one may immediately suspect,
distinguishing between a settlor's particular charitable intent and
general charitable intent (if any) is at best an imprecise task.46
b. Application to the Law of CharitableGifts
The doctrine of cy pres generally applies to gifts to charitable
corporations, 47 although judicial opinions fail to articulate a consistent
position on whether a gift to a charitable corporation constitutes a
transfer in trust. 4 For those courts that characterize gifts to charitable
corporations as transfers in trust, the doctrine of cy pres obviously
applies to such gifts, to the same extent that the doctrine applies to
any transfer in trust for charitable purposes under state law.49 Other
courts, which are more sensitive to the distinction between a
charitable corporation and a charitable trust, have declined to find
that a gift to a charitable corporation necessarily creates a trust.5"
Nonetheless, if the doctrine of cy pres generally applies to charitable
trusts under state law, such courts also apply the doctrine to gifts to
charitable corporations.5
Thus, regardless of whether a charitable
44. See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y Daughters Am. Revolution v. Goodman, 736 A.2d 1205
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); 15 Am. Jur. 2d Charities § 154 (2002).
45. See Gallaudet Univ., 699 A.2d at 547; 15 Am. Jur. 2d Charities § 154 (2002)
(citing cases).
46. See Scott, supra note 13, § 399.2.
47. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 348 cmt. f (1959); Bogert, supra note 16,
§ 431, at 105; Scott, supra note 13, § 348.1; see, e.g., MacCurdy-Salisbury Educ. Fund
v. Killian, 309 A.2d 11, 14 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1973); In re Brundrett's Estate, 87 N.Y.S.2d
851, 852-53 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
48. See Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487, 489 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1967) ("To what extent a charitable corporation is to be governed by laws
applicable to charitable trusts is a vexed question to which the authorities give
irreconcilable answers."); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 348 cmt. f (1959)
(observing that some courts consider restricted gifts to a charitable corporation to be
held in trust, whereas other courts do not); Scott, supra note 13, § 348.1 (stating that
courts are split in characterizing gifts to charitable corporations as gifts in trust); Note,
The Charitable Corporation,64 Harv. L. Rev. 1168, 1171 (1951) ("Whether or not a
charitable corporation should be said to hold the property it administers upon a trust
is a question to which the authorities give irreconcilable answers.").
49. See 15 Am. Jur. 2d Charities§ 8 (2002) ("A condition attached to a gift may be
considered as tantamount to imposing a trust, and if the condition involves
application for charitable purposes, a charitable trust will result.").
50. See, e.g., St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 22 N.E.2d 305, 308 (N.Y. 1939) (stating
that a gift to a corporation for a specific charitable purpose is not technically a gift in
trust because the "trustee and beneficiary are one").
51. See, e.g., In re Brooklyn Children's Aid Soc'y, 55 N.Y.S.2d 323, 324 (App. Div.
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transfer is made in trust or as an outright, restricted gift to a
corporation organized for charitable purposes, courts in most states
hold that the doctrine of cy pres potentially applies to a gift to a
charitable corporation.
c.

Application to Funds Received Through Mass Solicitations

A review of the voluminous case law on the subject suggests that
express restrictions imposed by donors appear to be the most common
type of restrictions from which charities seek to depart under the
doctrine of cy pres. What is less obvious is that funds received by a
charity may be restricted for a particular charitable purpose even
when a donor has not expressly limited the charitable donee's use of
contributions to a specified purpose. This situation arises when a
charity solicits funds from the general public and represents that
donated funds will be used for a specified purpose of the donee. Case
law supports the conclusion that contributions by donors in response
to a public solicitation for funds for a specific charitable purpose likely
constitute restricted gifts when accepted by the charitable donee.
A representative case is Kerner v. Thompson,52 in which the mayor
of Chicago issued a proclamation appealing to the general public for
donations to assist victims of the 1927 flood that ravaged the
Mississippi Valley.53 Although nearly $140,000 was collected in the
relief effort, only approximately $36,000 was expended to aid flood
victims directly. 4 The mayor thereafter transferred the balance of the
flood relief fund to a newly formed flood control corporation, which
disbursed in excess of $72,000 for purposes other than aiding flood
victims directly." In discussing the application of cy pres to such
funds, the court first concluded that the purpose of the fund held and
1945) (denying a charitable organization's request to expend endowment funds for
costs of operation because no evidence was offered as to impossibility or
impracticability of observing the various terms of the gift); Knickerbocker Hosp. v.
Goldstein, 41 N.Y.S.2d 32, 35-36 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (finding the gift was absolute and not
in trust, then authorizing cy pres modification permitted by statute); Barnum v.
D'Hendecourt, 28 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ("That the bequests were not in
trust but were outright gifts does not preclude the application of the cy pres
doctrine."); In re Lawless' Will, 87 N.Y.S.2d 386, 394 (Surr. Ct. 1949) ("The charitable
corporation is not bound by all the limitations and rules which apply to a technical
trustee. It may not, however, receive a gift made for one purpose and use it for
another, unless the Court applying the cy pres doctrine so commands." (internal
citations omitted)).
52. 13 N.E.2d 110 (111.App. Ct. 1938).
53. Id. at 111. For an excellent discussion of the 1927 flood and its economic,
social, and political consequences, see John M. Barry, Rising Tide: The Great
Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How it Changed America (1997).
54. Kerner, 110 N.E.2d at 111.
55. The remaining funds were ordered in prior proceedings to be transferred to
the American Red Cross for assisting future victims of flooding in the Mississippi
Valley. See id. at 113. This portion of the lower court's decree was not appealed.
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later transferred by the mayor "was controlled by the proclamation
and appeal for funds. '56 Emphasizing that the public appeal referred
specifically to the need to aid flood victims, the court held that the
contributions were restricted for that very purpose, and that the
mayor had no authority to expend surplus funds for any other
purpose.57
Under Kerner v. Thompson and similar authorities, 58 contributions
by donors in response to a public solicitation for funds for a specific
charitable purpose constitute restricted gifts. Accordingly, if a
charitable donee finds itself unable to devote such solicited funds to
the specific charitable purpose on account of impossibility, illegality,
or impracticability, a court may direct an alternative charitable use of
such funds under the doctrine of cy pres if the funds were received
from donors who possessed general charitable intent.59 Of course, the
italicized phrase exposes a major difficulty in applying the traditional
doctrine of cy pres to publicly solicited funds. The search for general
charitable intent proceeds by examining the intent of the individual
who donated the funds in question. In the case of funds received
through mass solicitations, a court employing the traditional cy pres
56. ld. at 113.
57. Id.; see also id. at 115 ("[T]he object of the fund was determined and fixed by
the appeal and the proclamation in 1927.").
58. See, e.g., Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. Felzner Post, Inc., 159 N.E. 771, 772-73 (Ind.
App. 1928) (en banc) (stating that public donations raised specifically to aid men and
women in the military comprised a "charitable fund to be administered for a specified
purpose"); Loch v. Mayer, 100 N.Y.S. 837, 838 (Sup. Ct. 1906) (holding that funds
donated to aid victims of a steamboat disaster were impressed with a trust for such
purposes when the conduct, and oral and written declarations of all relevant parties,
indicated that the donations would be so used); Proctor v. Mathers, 17 Ohio App. 118
(Ohio Ct. App. 1922) (holding that money raised to aid Ohio servicemen during the
war was a charitable fund designated for a particular purpose, and deviation from the
original purposes was appropriate only under the doctrine of cy pres); cf Brown v.
Concerned Citizens for Sickle Cell Anemia, Inc., 382 N.E.2d 1155, 1158 (Ohio 1978)
(holding that funds received through bingo operations must be used for charitable
purposes when the public was informed, through newspaper advertisements and an
awards ceremony, that funds generated from the activity would benefit a charitable
entity). Also of interest is National Foundation v. First National Bank of Catawba
County, 288 F.2d 831 (4th Cir. 1961). In this case, the district court had found that
funds collected by a local chapter of a national charity for the care and treatment of
Catawba County victims of poliomyelitis were impressed with a public trust restricting
their use to Catawba County. The district court reasoned that promoters in Catawba
County had publicly emphasized that fifty percent of contributions would remain with
the local chapter. Id. at 834. The Court of Appeals eliminated this restriction after
finding no evidence that any donor whose contribution was accepted had imposed any
condition upon her gift. See id. at 834-36. Although the court acknowledged that
donors could be held to manifest an intent to restrict donated funds to a particular
purpose when responding to special appeals for a specified, limited purpose, the court
explained that the appeals at issue were made simply through annual campaigns
supporting the general purposes of the national charity. See id. at 836.
59. See Edith L. Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States §§ 6.03-6.03(a)
(1950) (discussing the application of the doctrine of cy pres to surplus funds, including
those resulting from public donations).
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approach would be required to hear evidence of the intent of
hundreds, and even thousands, of persons who have contributed some
amount of money (however small) to the soliciting charity.
Attempting to determine the charitable intent of each and every
donor in a massive, geographically expansive fundraising drive could
easily prove to be a daunting judicial task.'
In view of this difficulty, it is readily understandable that courts
deciding the fate of publicly solicited funds that cannot be used for the
intended charitable purpose tend to take some liberty in applying cy
pres through the use of presumptions, expressly or implicitly.
Unfortunately, however, the decisions of these courts fail to provide
charities, or donors, with clear guidance of the probable ultimate
disposition of such funds. A survey of a few relevant cases will
illustrate the unpredictable approaches of the courts.
Some courts appear to presume that donors who contribute to a
fund of a charitable donee seeking broad public support for a
designated purpose, such as disaster relief, intend to part permanently
with their money; such courts will apply cy pres to excess funds (or
funds subject to a restriction that fails for any reason). 6 For example,
in Kerner v. Thompson, the appellate court directed the trial court to
order the mayor of Chicago to transfer the amount of funds not used
to aid the victims of the 1927 Mississippi Valley flood to the American
Red Cross for the purpose of aiding future flood victims in the
Mississippi Valley (or for some other closely related purpose).6 2 The
court plainly reached its decision under the doctrine of cy pres, and
even cited authority recognizing that a prerequisite to applying the
doctrine is that the donor had a clear intention to devote the gift to a
charitable purpose.63 The court never directly addressed whether any
evidence established the general charitable intent of any specific
donor or group of donors. Rather, the court appeared to look solely
60. Cf Frank Smithies Rowley, Disposition of Surplus Funds in Trusts Created by
Public Contributions,2 U. Cin. L. Rev. 417 (1928) (stating that the proper disposition
of surplus funds collected through public subscription depends upon the intent of
donors, which is often "vague and uncertain"). Conceivably, a court could devise a
proxy for actual donor intent, such as estimating the percentage of donors who have
general charitable intent by surveying a sampling of donors. Cf Kralstein v. Comm'r,
38 T.C. 810, 815-19 (1962) (apportioning amounts received by a taxpayer in
connection with a testimonial dinner held in his honor between sums intended as gifts
and sums included in gross income). Of course, speculating on actual donor intent
based upon statistical sampling does not technically comport with existing cy pres
doctrine, which looks to the actual intent of each donor.
61. See Bogert, supra note 16, § 437 (citing numerous cases); see, e.g., In re Welsh
Hosp. Fund, I Ch. 655, 660 (1921), reprinted in Bogert, supra note 16, at § 431
(holding that funds raised through street collections and personal solicitations to aid
the sick and wounded in World War I in excess of those needed to accomplish such
purposes need not be returned to the donors; inferring an intent by donors to part
irrevocably with their donated funds) (opinion of Lawrence, J.).
62. See Kerner v. Thompson, 13 N.E.2d 110, 115 (I1. App. Ct. 1938).
63. See id. at 114 (citing Bruce v. Maxwell, 143 N.E. 82, 85 (Il1. 1924)).
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to the circumstances surrounding the donations-a broad public
appeal for disaster relief-and inferred sub silentio general charitable
intent by contributors to the fund.
Other courts, unwilling to apply cy pres to surplus contributions
raised for a specified fund, have held or stated in dicta that donors do
or may have a right to a pro rata return of any unused balance.6 4 To
illustrate, in Sloan v. Robert Jack Post No. 1322, V.F. W.,65 committees
of two veterans organizations solicited donations for the construction
of a building for use by all veterans. However, the two organizations
could not agree on the construction of a building that would be used
in a manner precisely conforming to representations previously made
to donors.66 Although the court recognized the validity of the cy pres
doctrine, the court stated that the doctrine applies only when "the
general objective is never lost sight of.

'67

According to the court,

because the plans contemplated by the organizations varied from
representations made to donors, the veterans organizations failed to
"perform the implied contract," and the trust failed. 6' Therefore, the
court was unable to exercise its equitable powers and apply cy pres
"when [the] dominant rights of contributors intervened. '61 Although
the court did not expressly articulate its rationale in terms of
presuming that the contributors lacked general charitable intent, such
a presumption seems implicit in the court's analysis. The court
emphasized the unwillingness of the veterans organizations to
implement a plan that conformed precisely to representations made to
donors, and characterized modest variations from the plan disclosed
to donors as involving substantial alterations."' In other words, the
64. See, e.g., Nelson v. Madison Lutheran Hosp. & Sanatorium, 297 N.W. 424,
426-27 (Wis. 1941) (holding cy pres inapplicable to contributions received from
subscribers for the construction of a sanatorium when the subscription agreements did
not demonstrate general charitable intent; affirming trial court's order to repay
contributions to donors); cf. Honaker v. City of Princeton, 25 S.E.2d 772, 774-75 (W.
Va. 1943) (finding a resulting trust in favor of the donors pro rata by subscription
where the donee had procured equitable interests in land from a large number of
donors for an unsuccessful plan to build a college and the largest donor objected to
subsequent plans to use the land for an airport). At least one court has approved the
application of cy pres to excess funds received in a charitable fundraising drive, but
only because excess funds could not be returned to donors, whose identities were
unknown. See, e.g., In re Distribution of Funds of Y.M.C.A. War Fund, 25 N.E.2d
956, 960 (Ohio Ct. App. 1939). The position that cy pres should be applied only
because donors were unknown is puzzling. If the donors had general charitable intent
(a prerequisite to the application of cy pres), funds should not have been returned to
them even if their identities were known.
65. 239 S.W.2d 591, 591 (Ark. 1951).
66. See id. at 592.
67. Id. at 593.
68. Id.
69. Id. The court concluded, however, that the sum of $110 received in
connection with a carnival sponsored by one of the organizations was "different from
the donations and can not be refunded." Id.
70. See id.
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proposed plans violated the donors' specific charitable intent. As
discussed above, under the cy pres doctrine, when the specific
charitable intent of a donor cannot be carried out, the trust fails in the
absence of a finding that the donor possessed general charitable
intent. Thus, the court's opinion is probably best understood as
presuming that donors had only a specific charitable intent to finance
a building to be used precisely as represented to them in connection
with the solicitation for funds.
Unfortunately, the most authoritative non-judicial icons of trust law
do not provide a clear answer as to how best to dispose of restricted
funds solicited from the general public when the charitable donee
believes that a surplus exists. A comment to the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts states as follows:
If property is given to a charitable corporation to be applied to one
of the purposes of the corporation, and the purpose is fully
accomplished without exhausting the trust property, the court will
direct the application of the surplus by the corporation to the other
charitable purposes of the corporation, unless the settlor manifested
an intention to restrict his gift to the particular purpose which he
specified."
While this statement is doctrinally correct, it is of limited value. When
a charitable corporation solicits funds from the general public, one of
the most difficult questions is whether, in the words of the
Restatement, a donor has "manifested an intention to restrict his gift to
the particular purpose which he specified." The Restatement offers no
real guidance in answering this question.
Nor does the Restatement offer greater insight in its comment
specifically discussing the disposition of a charitable fund arising from
numerous public donations:
If several persons contribute to a fund to be applied to a particular
charitable purpose, and the purpose is fully accomplished without
exhausting the trust property, and the doctrine of cy pres is not
applicable, a resulting trust of the surplus will arise in favor of the
contributors who will be entitled to share it in proportion to their
contributions.7 2
As the previous discussion indicates, courts have struggled with how
to apply the doctrine of cy pres when numerous donors contribute to a
fund for a particular charitable purpose. Yet comment d to section
400 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts completely dodges the
question of when, and to what extent, the doctrine of cy pres applies
to such a fund.
One of this country's eminent trust law scholars, the late Professor
George Gleason Bogert, opined that when funds raised through
71. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 400 cmt. c (1959).
72. Id. § 400 cmt. d (emphasis added); cf id. § 399 cmt. r.
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public gifts fail for any reason (including partial failure attributable to
excess funding), "it would seem that the contributors intend to part
with their donations irrevocably and expect no return," so that donors
have the requisite general intent necessary for the application of cy
pres.73 Professor Bogert acknowledged, however, that courts have not
consistently followed his reasoning,74 and he did not provide any
further justification for his notion. Thus, both the case law and its
leading expositors do little but join us in the quest to satisfactorily
dispose of restricted surplus funds solicited by charities from the
general public.
B. Federal Income Tax Law and the Doctrine of Cy Pres
Most organizations conducting mass appeals for donations are
exempt from federal income taxation under section 501(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code (sometimes referred to herein as the "Code")
as entities which are described in Code section 501(c)(3).7 5 This
section describes organizations commonly known simply as
"charities." Federal income tax law treats these charitable entities
(and contributions thereto) with favor. Notably, the federal income
tax laws governing charities, and contributions to charitable entities,
can circumscribe the tax-advantaged activity of charitable donors and
donees in a way that invites the application of the cy pres doctrine (or
at least requires a court to grapple with whether the cy pres doctrine
should be applied). How the federal income tax regime intertwines
with the doctrine of cy pres is discussed in this section of the article.
Two areas of federal income tax law are relevant to a thorough cy
pres analysis of excess donations received from the general public.
The first is the set of legal requirements that a charitable entity must
satisfy in maintaining exemption from federal income taxation.76 The
second is the requirement of "finality" that must characterize a
deductible charitable contribution.77 Each area is discussed in turn,
followed by an analysis of how the substantive rules interact with the
cy pres doctrine in the context of excess funds raised by charitable
donees through public solicitations.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Bogert, supra note 16, § 437 at 144.
See id. (citing cases).
See I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) (West 2001).
See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
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Maintaining Federal Income Tax Exemption: Avoiding Private
Inurement and Excessive Private Benefit
a.

In General

Code section 501(c)(3) includes only entities that are both
organized and operated exclusively for purposes considered beneficial
to the community, such as charitable, educational, religious, or
scientific purposes."8 Further, an organization qualifies under section
501(c)(3) only if "no part of the net earnings [of the organization]
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."7 This
prohibition against the use of a charity's earnings for private gain is
known as the private inurement doctrine."' It has been described as
"the fundamental defining principle" of nonprofit organizations," a
characterization that is especially true in the case of charitable
nonprofit entities, the income tax exemption of which depends upon
not running afoul of the doctrine.
By its statutory terms, the private inurement doctrine prohibits only
the inurement of a charity's net earnings8 2 to a "private shareholder or
individual." Construed broadly, a "private individual" could include
any legal or natural person. Under such an interpretation of the
statutory language, an organization would fail the test of Code section
501(c)(3) if at any time its "net earnings" improperly enriched at least
one person. Under such an expansive interpretation of the statute, a
charitable organization could lose its exemption from federal income
taxation simply by committing an isolated mistake in overpaying any
provider of goods, services or facilities who in general has very little
influence over the organization. Such a result would seem unduly
punitive, and even irrational. Thus, quite reasonably, the phrase
78. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2001); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (2002).
79. 1.R.C. § 501(c)(3). A transaction that violates the prohibition against private
inurement also likely gives rise to excise taxes under section 4958 of the Internal
Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 4958 (West 2001). Code section 4958 imposes excise
taxes on "excess benefit transactions" (generally, transactions in which an applicable
tax-exempt organization conveys a benefit on a "disqualified person" that is greater
than the consideration received by the tax-exempt organization). Id. In general, the
taxes are imposed upon managers of organizations who intentionally participate in
the decision to enter into the transaction, and upon the disqualified persons involved.
Id. A disqualified person includes, in relevant part, any person who can exercise
substantial influence over the affairs of the organization. See generally id.
80. See generally Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations 42760 (7th ed. 1998) (discussing the private inurement doctrine).
81. Id. at 427.
82. The phrase "net earnings" is misleading, for private inurement may be found
even when the charity does not make a distribution of profits to a private person. The
private inurement doctrine essentially condemns transactions between a charitable
organization and a controlling insider whenever the charitable entity receives less
than fair consideration for what it provides the private individual. See id. at 428-31
(discussing the essence of private inurement and the meaning of "net earnings").
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"private shareholder or individual" has been interpreted more
narrowly by the IRS and the courts than is theoretically compelled by
the statutory language. Only if a person has a "personal and private
interest in the activities of the organization" will she be deemed a
"private shareholder or individual."83
Case law supports the
conclusion that a person generally has such an interest only if she can
exert control over the charity's operations, although whether such
control must be formal is not a settled issue.84
Under this approach, of course, the class of people who may receive
benefits from a charity in violation of the private inurement doctrine
is to some degree limited, for the number of persons able to control
the operations of a charitable organization is finite. Consequently, the
prohibition against private inurement of net earnings is not implicated
in many transactions that bestow benefits upon non-charitable
persons. Nonetheless, a charity that confers a benefit on someone
who is not a "private shareholder or individual" may still forfeit its
income tax exemption. This conclusion follows from a doctrine
related to, but theoretically distinct from, the private inurement
prohibition. The doctrine is the prohibition against unlawful private
benefit (the "private benefit doctrine").
The Treasury Regulations establish that an "organization is not
organized or operated exclusively for purposes [described in Code
section 501(c)(3)] unless it serves a public rather than a private
interest." 6 In interpreting this provision of the Treasury regulations,
the Tax Court has held that an organization fails to qualify for income
tax exemption when it benefits private interests more than
insubstantially, relative to the general public benefits conferred
83. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (2002).
84. Compare United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 165
F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding no private inurement when a professional
fundraising firm that dominated a charitable entity could not formally control it), with
Variety Club Tent No. 6 Charities, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1485, 1493
(1997) (finding that a person had the requisite private interest in a charity when he
had a significant voice in its operations and formal and informal control over much of
its income). The IRS's concept of the degree of "control" necessary to render a
person a "private shareholder or individual" with respect to a charity appears to have
evolved somewhat in recent years. To illustrate, in General Counsel Memorandum
39498 (Jan. 28, 1986), the IRS opined that physicians have a personal and private
interest in the activities of a hospital (i.e., that physicians constitute "private
shareholders or individuals") if they are employees of the hospital or have a close
working relationship with the hospital (such as staff physicians). The IRS now appears
to recognize that a staff physician is not necessarily a "private shareholder or
individual" with respect to an exempt hospital if she does not have substantial
influence over its affairs. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-1 C.B. 121. See
generally Hopkins, supra note 80, § 19.3, at 431-35 (discussing who qualifies as an
"insider" for purposes of the prohibition against private inurement).
85. See generally Hopkins, supra note 80, at 460-62 (discussing the private benefit
doctrine and observing that the doctrine is distinct from, yet to some extent subsumes,
the private inurement doctrine).
86. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2002).
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thereby. 7 For obvious reasons, the test can hardly be applied with
great objectivity. Even more subjective is the approach of the IRS,
which considers a private benefit "incidental" only if it is incidental in
both a quantitative and a qualitative sense." According to the IRS, a
private benefit is quantitatively incidental only if it is not substantial
once the overall public benefit conferred by the activity is considered.
A benefit is qualitatively incidental only if the benefit is a necessary
concomitant of the activity which benefits the public at large (i.e., the
benefit to the public cannot be achieved without benefiting certain
private individuals). 9
Thus, an organization that advances purposes that are plainly
charitable may forfeit its income tax exemption by conferring certain
benefits upon private parties. Under the private inurement doctrine,
the charity's federal income tax exemption is jeopardized if it confers
any net benefit upon a person who exercises control over its
operations.
Under the private benefit doctrine, a charitable
organization will sacrifice its exemption if it confers a benefit upon
any private party (even someone who lacks an ongoing relationship
with the charity) that, relative to the overall public benefits provided
by the charity, is not merely incidental.
b. Application to Mass Appeals for Restricted CharitableGifts
A charitable donee that receives public donations restricted for a
charitable purpose may risk its federal income tax exemption under
the private benefit doctrine (or, less likely, under the private
inurement doctrine) in some circumstances.
The most readily
envisaged scenario involves a geographically broad, well-publicized
campaign to raise funds to provide direct financial assistance to a
87. See, e.g., Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 92 T.C. 1053,
1067-79 (1989) (holding that an organization that trained people for careers in
political campaigning substantially benefited private interests (the Republican party
and its candidates) and therefore failed to qualify as a tax-exempt educational
organization).
88. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 37789 (Dec. 18, 1978). In this General Counsel
Memorandum, the IRS opined that the leasing of land by a hospital to members of its
medical staff for $1.00 per year would give rise to more than incidental private benefit
when the land could have been leased to the doctors at fair market value, and the
benefit to the doctors was almost as great as the benefit to the public. Similarly, in
General Counsel Memorandum 39498, discussed supra note 84, the IRS concluded
that a salary income guarantee may fail scrutiny under the private benefit doctrine. In
applying the "qualitative" test of incidental private benefit, the IRS lacked sufficient
facts to determine whether an income guarantee was the sole means that a hospital
could use to recruit a physician practicing in a field of medical specialization in order
to enable the hospital to provide excellent health care services. Further, because the
subsidies to the recruited physician were not capped (except by a total income
guarantee), the contemplated financial incentives may not have been quantitatively
incidental to the hospital's attempt to further exempt purposes.
89. See id.

2003]

CHARITABLE GIFTS

1847

limited number of people who have suffered some catastrophe
(whether a flood, fire, earthquake, tornado, or act of terrorism).
Certainly, aiding the victims of disasters is a charitable purpose.
Moreover, providing direct financial assistance (i.e., money) to victims
is often entirely appropriate. However, as with all activities that
further a charitable purpose, relief must not be conducted in a manner
that runs afoul of the private benefit doctrine.
Consider the delivery of aid to the victims, and the surviving
members of the families of victims, of the September 11 terrorist
attacks. Literally billions of dollars have been raised by charitable
organizations to assist these victims. Certainly, providing numerous
forms of aid to those who have suffered so directly from this tragedy
(including, for example, shelter, food, medical care, counseling
services, and in some cases direct financial aid) is a charitable activity
promoting extensive public good. However, after basic needs have
been met, and funds to provide for the victims' anticipated future
needs have been set aside, expending more and more dollars for the
benefit of the members of this limited charitable class will produce a
proportionately lower increase in public benefit. At some point,
albeit one that is not identified with ease, we must acknowledge that
additional aid provided to or for the benefit of the members of this
charitable class will very likely benefit them as individuals more than
the community at large, especially if such aid is primarily financial.
Had special legislation not been enacted,9" a charity that devotes
increasingly greater resources to or for the benefit of the victims of
the tragic acts of terrorism at some point likely would have
jeopardized its federal income tax exemption under the private
benefit doctrine.
Admittedly, the outpouring of charitable gifts following September
11 was extraordinary, as was the special tax legislation enacted in
response to the unusual events. It is not at all inconceivable, however,
that the same private benefit problem has arisen (and will arise) on a
smaller scale on the heels of other disasters receiving less global (and
less congressional) attention. The potential for the problem is real,
for example, whenever a rather small community is devastated by a
calamity that is publicized extensively. Further, the potential for
private benefit seems especially acute when the tragedy results in
harm which is not easily quantified, as in the case of a local epidemic
that affects people who are not of income-earning age. Generous,
empathetic people may desire to contribute money to organizations
serving the survivors of such a tragedy, but in such cases money can
help only to a limited degree. If the organization simply transfers
contributed funds to the survivors, or even provides a wide range of
services in kind to them, without considering the true community
90. See supra note 11.
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benefit in doing so, once again the organization may benefit private
persons more than incidentally, thereby jeopardizing its federal
income tax exemption.9 1
The potential for excessive private benefit is not limited to public
appeals for victims of disasters. The problem may arise anytime a
charity binds itself in public solicitations to use donated funds for a
restricted purpose that necessarily confers a significant benefit on a
private person. For example, consider a small, underfunded parochial
school that has been unable to attract proficient teachers. In an effort
to attract outstanding instructors, the school conducts an intense
fundraising campaign targeting all state residents who are members of
the religious denomination with which the school is affiliated. The
school represents that contributions will be used to endow five (and
only five) teaching chairs, and all income from the endowment will be
distributed annually to the five teachers hired by the school.
Endowing a chair in the educational profession is commonplace, and
normally results in no excessive private benefit; the teacher holding
the endowed chair is merely the necessary means for accomplishing
the end of promoting the education of students. 92 Let us assume,
however, that the school's campaign is wildly successful, and the
income from the endowment results in the receipt by each of the five
teachers of a salary that is three times greater than the market rate.
On these facts, one must inquire as to whether complying with the
restriction would confer a private benefit that is more than incidental.
Determining whether the benefit is quantitatively incidental would be
difficult. At a minimum, however, if the evidence established that the
school could have hired teachers some other way (such as by paying
them a salary merely at the high end of the market, or offering less
costly employee benefits), or that the students' instruction could have
been enhanced sufficiently by some other means, the organization's
activities would likely be found to confer a private benefit that is not
qualitatively incidental.
It is also conceivable that public solicitations for a restricted
charitable purpose could result in private inurement of the donee's
net earnings. Private inurement would arise if persons with some
degree of control over the organization ultimately benefit from
contributed funds without furnishing adequate consideration therefor.
An organization should be able to avoid this problem, however, by
not disbursing funds to or for those who exercise control over the
organization. Thus, the greater concern for exempt organizations

91. This observation is more than a purely hypothetical problem concocted by an
overzealous academic. Indeed, the IRS's official publication on disaster relief is
sensitive to the issues raised in this discussion. See I.R.S. Publication 3833, Disaster
Relief: Providing Assistance Through Charitable Organizations 5-9 (2002).
92. See Hopkins, supra note 80, at 111.
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soliciting funds for a restricted purpose is probably the private benefit
doctrine.
2.

Qualifying for the Charitable Contribution Deduction
a. In General

Federal income tax law extends favorable treatment not only to the
income of charitable entities described in Code section 501(c)(3), but
also to taxpayers who make contributions to such entities. Subject to
certain limitations, section 170(a) of the Code allows a deduction for
any "charitable contribution" made by a taxpayer within a taxable
year.93 A charitable contribution is "a contribution or gift to or for the
use of" designated entities, including "a corporation, trust, or
community chest, fund, or foundation... organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes" that meets certain requirements governing organizations
described in Code section 501(c)(3).94
An important element of a deductible "gift" is non-conditionality
(or finality), although such non-conditionality is determined under a
standard of improbability, rather than impossibility. Under the
Treasury regulations, a gift is not deductible if the transfer "is
dependent upon the performance of some act or the happening of a
precedent event" before the gift is effective, unless "the possibility
that the charitable transfer will not become effective is so remote as to
be negligible. 9 5 Thus, a deduction may not be available to a taxpayer
whose gift requires the charity to perform some act before receiving
outright ownership of the property to be transferred. Similarly, a
taxpayer who gives property to a charity subject to a condition
subsequent (i.e., the subsequent performance of an act or occurrence
of an event) may claim a charitable contribution deduction if the
possibility that the condition subsequent will occur "appears on the
date of the gift to be so remote as to be negligible."96 Under the
regulations, the obvious practical difficulty is determining whether the
possibility of divestment of a charitable gift (or failure of such a gift to
vest in the first instance) is "so remote as to be negligible,"
particularly because such determination must be made at the time of
the transfer to the charity.9" The case law9" and administrative rulings
93. 1.R.C. § 170 (a).
94. Id. § 170(c)(2).
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(e) (2002).
96. Id. The regulations illustrate this rule with a case in which a taxpayer donates
land to a city to be used as a public park. Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., 885 Inv. Co. v. Comrn'r of Internal Revenue, 95 T.C. 156, 161-62
(t990) (holding that partners could not deduct their distributive share of a
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of the IRS99 interpreting this rule illustrate its application.
For example, in Briggs v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,""' the
taxpayer donated land to a charitable corporation created to benefit
Native Americans. An agreement between the parties required the
property to be developed for use as a cultural, educational, and
medical center, and imposed various other conditions and
restrictions.""1
Efforts to develop the property for its intended
charitable use failed, and it was later transferred to another charity
pursuant to an amended agreement." 2 After concluding that the
restrictions constituted conditions subsequent under state law (and
therefore the taxpayer retained a right of reentry), the Tax Court held
that the taxpayer was not entitled to a charitable contribution
deduction. "3 The court determined that the possibility that the
conditions subsequent would occur did not appear on the date of the
gift to be "so remote as to be negligible" within the meaning of the
Treasury regulations.'
The court relied on precedent interpreting
identical language in the estate tax regulations1 "5 to refer to "a chance
which persons generally would disregard as so highly improbable that
it might be ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious
business transaction.""" According to the Tax Court, as of the date of
partnership's donations of land to a city because such conveyances were subject to a
condition (the development of the land as a scenic corridor), the occurrence of which
was not so remote as to be negligible); Stotler v. Comm'r, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 973, 979
(1987) (holding that there was no significant likelihood that a scenic easement
donated to a governmental unit would revert to the donors pursuant to a contractual
provision triggered upon condemnation of the subject property due to enlargement of
a dam when (i) plans for such enlargement of the dam had never been approved, (ii)
other alternatives had been considered, and (iii) enlargement of the dam would result
in the condemnation of less than one-half of one percent of the property); see also
Gagne v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 498, 502-03 (1951) (holding that a charitable contribution
made subject to the charitable donee's compliance with certain conditions was
deductible in the year that the donee agreed to the conditions and accepted the gift).
99. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-249, 1979-2 C.B. 104 (holding that contributions to a
political subdivision for a building project are not deductible until the donee transfers
the sums to a building fund because the donee informed donors that all contributions
would be refunded if sufficient funds were not raised; reasoning that such donations
are subject to a precedent event, and the possibility that the charitable transfers will
not become effective is not so remote as to be negligible).
100. 72 T.C. 646, 647-48 (1980) (unpublished opinion), afjd 665 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir.
1981).
101. Id. at 648-49.
102. Id. at 651.
103. See id. at 656-59.
104. Id. at 657.
105. See id. at 656-57. Section 20.2055-2(b) of the Estate Tax Regulations allows a
deduction from the gross estate for a charitable gift if an interest passes to a charity at
the time of a decedent's death and the interest is subject to a condition subsequent,
"the possibility of occurrence of which appeared at the time of the decedent's death
to be so remote as to be negligible." See id. at 656.
106. See id. at 656-57 (quoting United States v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir.
1955)). The court also cited precedent interpreting the quoted language to refer to "a
chance which every dictate of reason would justify an intelligent person in
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the gift, there was a real possibility that the conditions specified in the
agreement might not be met."°7 In relevant part, the court observed
that the taxpayer had not provided money for the construction of the
center, no financing was readily available, the administrators of the
charitable donee lacked experience obtaining funding, and thus the
center might never exist."' 8 Accordingly, "the possibility that the
property would not be used for the establishment of the center was
not so remote as to be negligible.""' 9
b. Application to Mass Appeals for Restricted CharitableGifts
Let us assume that a tax-exempt charitable organization solicits
contributions from the general public and represents that all
donations will be returned to the donors if sufficient funds are not
received for accomplishing the specific charitable project identified by
the donee in advance of receiving donations. Does subjecting the
continued receipt of donations by the charity to this condition, which
is based upon the amount of funds collected, raise an issue of
deductibility under the Treasury regulation discussed above? More
precisely, are donors responding to the mass solicitation entitled to a
charitable contribution deduction for the year in which they transfer
funds to the charity because "the possibility that the charitable
transfer will not become effective is so remote as to be negligible,"
within the meaning of the regulations? Administrative authority
suggests that a deduction is not necessarily proper in the first year that
a donation is made.
In Revenue Ruling 79-249,1 " a municipal corporation sought
contributions from the public to finance ten percent of its costs in
constructing a new high school building. The corporation would hold
contributions until it had received sufficient gifts, at which time the
The
money would be transferred to a construction fund."'
corporation represented that if the contributions were not ultimately
sufficient, it would return the funds to the donors.' 1 2 If the
contributions were more than sufficient, the corporation would retain
such excess for general school purposes." 3 The IRS ruled that
deductions for charitable contributions were allowable to donors only

disregarding as so highly improbable and remote as to be lacking in reason and
substance." See id. at 657 (citing Estate of Woodworth v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 193, 196
(1966)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The court further opined that other conditions caused the gift to fail under
the Treasury regulations. See id. at 657-59.
110. 1979-2 C.B. 104.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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when the donee transferred the contributions to the construction fund
or retained them for general school purposes.'" The IRS reasoned
that the building would be constructed only if the donee raised a
specific amount of contributions, and concluded that as of the date of
the gifts, an effective transfer for charitable purposes depended upon
15
the performance of an act or the happening of a precedent event.'
The IRS further observed that the return of donations depended only
upon whether sufficient donations were received.' 6 Accordingly, the
possibility that the charitable transfer would not become effective was
not so remote as to be negligible within the meaning of the Treasury
regulations.' 17
Revenue Ruling 79-249 involved a condition precedent (obtaining
sufficient funding), the possibility of non-occurrence of which was not
so remote as to be negligible."' One can easily imagine a similar
situation involving excess funding. Consider a tax-exempt charitable
organization that solicits contributions from the general public for a
restricted purpose, and represents that donations will be returned to
the extent that they exceed the amount of funds needed to accomplish
a specific charitable project identified by the donee in advance of
receiving donations. In this case, the charitable donee and all donors
rightly believe that donated funds will be accepted by the charity, at
least some of the contributions will be used for charitable purposes,
and only if the charity ultimately receives "too much money" will
some contributions be returned. The problem is that this scenario
involves a contingency similar to that in Revenue Ruling 79-249.
Although the contingency in this scenario would probably best be
characterized as a condition subsequent, such characterization is of no
import under the Treasury regulations."19 What matters is that in this
hypothetical, as in Revenue Ruling 79-249, whether any particular
taxpayer-donor's contribution ultimately will be used by the
charitable donee (or instead returned to the donor) depends upon the
amount of giving by other donors. In other words, whether a
taxpayer-donor's contribution will remain with the donee or instead
be returned to the donor depends upon a "contingency"-the receipt
114. See id. at 105.
115. 1d.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. In Revenue Ruling 72-194, 1972-1 C.B. 94, the IRS ruled that sums advanced
by sponsors solicited by a state agency to pay any deficit incurred in the running of a
steeplechase race to promote tourism are deductible as charitable contributions only
to the extent used by the donee. The IRS stated that no portion of the advance
constituted a "payment" until the net amount to which the state was entitled had been
definitively determined by a final accounting. The ruling appears distinguishable
from the hypothetical raised in the text, insofar as in the ruling, the parties did not
agree that advanced sums would be owned by the donee prior to a determination of
the donee's deficit.
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by the charitable donee of contributions exceeding the amount
necessary to accomplish a specified charitable purpose. In Revenue
Ruling 79-249, the IRS ruled that a condition that depended upon the
amount of giving by other donors resulted in disallowance of a
charitable contribution deduction until the use of donated funds was
finally determined.12 Similarly, under the facts of the hypothetical
raised in the text, the IRS (and a court) could find that the likelihood
that a taxpayer's donation would be returned to her on account of
excess funding is not "so remote as to be negligible" within the
meaning of the Treasury regulations. If so, until a charity takes some
action to preclude the return of the donated funds to the donor, she
would not be entitled to claim a charitable contribution deduction for
her transfer to charity.
If charities soliciting funds from the general public for a restricted
purpose never return excess funds to donors, the problem raised in
the previous hypothetical would have only academic appeal. But as
the case law and media reports illustrate, the prospect that a charity
may be pressured or even required to return excess donations to
donors is grounded in reality. 21 Given this reality, under the Treasury
regulations and Revenue Ruling 79-249, a taxpayer is not necessarily
entitled to a deduction for a charitable contribution made in response
to a public appeal for funds for a designated purpose that reasonably
requires finite funding. A deduction is proper only if the probability
of the condition giving rise to the return of the taxpayer's donation is
"so remote as to be negligible. 1 ' 22 If the charity's public appeal for
funds is highly publicized, as in the case of solicitations for the relief of
the victims of the attacks of September 11, or if the price tag of a
specified charitable project is low relative to the pool of probable
donors and other sources of compensation for losses (such as private
insurance), the probability of the contingency giving rise to a return of
the taxpayer's donation (i.e., the probability of excess charitable
funding) may very well not be "so remote as to be negligible."
One should ask whether there is any real problem with the claiming
of a charitable contribution deduction by a taxpayer, notwithstanding
a substantial possibility that a contingency may occur that requires the
120. Rev. Rul. 79-249, 1979-2 C.B. 104, 105.
121. See, e.g., Corey Kilgannon, Red Cross Offers To Refund Gifts for Sept. 11,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 2001, at B10 (reporting that the American Red Cross announced
that it would return donations to contributors requesting refunds of their gifts);
Cheryl Wetzstein, Watchdog Urges Accounting for all Sept. 11 Charity Funds; Says
Groups Have Duty to Honor Donors or Refund Gifts, Wash. Times, Oct. 30, 2001, at
A10 ("Charities... have an obligation to honor donors' wishes, and if they can't
spend money raised for Sept. 11 relief on that issue, they should consider giving it
back, a charity watchdog said yesterday."); cf. Wheaton College Agrees to Return Gifts
to Donors Who Object to Co-Education, Chron. Higher Educ., June 15, 1988, at Al
(reporting that Wheaton College offered to return contributions to donors dissatisfied
with proposed changes to its gender-based admissions policies).
122. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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return of the contribution to the taxpayer. The argument that
claiming such a deduction is not a substantial problem would likely
rely on the tax benefit rule. In basic terms, under the tax benefit rule,
a taxpayer who recovers an item deducted in a previous year must
include the recovered item in income in the year of its recovery unless
the deduction did not decrease the taxpayer's federal income tax
liability in the previous year.'23 Thus, a taxpayer who in a previous
year wrongfully claims a deduction for a charitable contribution
subject to a material contingency must report the item as income in a
later year if and when the contingency occurs and the contribution is
returned to the taxpayer.'24
The most important response to this argument is that the tax benefit
rule ignores the time value of money.'2 5 For example, a taxpayer who
claims a charitable contribution deduction of $1,000 in year 1 (thereby
removing $1,000 of gross income from taxation in year 1) and then
recovers $1,000 in income in year 2 is in the same position as a
taxpayer who is allowed simply to defer recognition of $1,000 of year 1
income until year 2. The value of deferring income tax liability is now
so pervasively acknowledged that it merely need be noted herein.
Suffice it to say that a taxpayer who achieves this benefit of deferral is
receiving an interest-free loan from the government on his income tax
liability attributable to the deferred item. Because of the time value
of money, a taxpayer who wrongfully deducts a charitable
contribution in one year and then recovers the item in a subsequent
year is in a better position than a taxpayer who never claimed the
deduction in the first place. Correspondingly, the government is in a
worse position in the former case than in the latter. Thus, the tax
benefit rule does not "solve" the problem created when a taxpayer

123. See, e.g., Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370, 383 (1983) (holding
that under the tax benefit rule, a deduction previously taken must be recovered in
income whenever a subsequent event occurs that is "fundamentally inconsistent with
the premise on which the deduction was initially based"). For a thorough overview of
the tax benefit rule, see Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, 1 Federal Taxation of
Income, Estates and Gifts $ 5.7, at 5-42 to 5-64 (3d ed. 1999). The current statutory
embodiment of the tax benefit rule is Code section 111. See I.R.C. § 111(a) (West
2001) (stating that gross income does not include income attributable to the recovery
of a previously deducted amount "to the extent such amount did not reduce the
amount of tax imposed by this chapter").
124. See, e.g., 885 Inv. Co. v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. 156, 164-68 (1990) (applying the tax
benefit rule in a case to which an appeal would lie in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit). Although the Tax Court historically has not applied
the tax benefit rule when the original deduction was erroneous, see id. at 165, several
United States Courts of Appeal have done so, and the Tax Court must follow their
lead in deciding cases appealable to those courts. See id. at 166.
125. This point, which is apparent from an examination of the authorities
discussing the tax benefit rule, has been observed by others. See, e.g., Steven J. Willis,
The Tax Benefit Rule: A Different View and a Unified Theory of Error Correction, 42
Fla. L. Rev. 575, 593-94 (1990).
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erroneously deducts a charitable contribution subject to a condition
requiring the later recovery of the item in income.
3. Relationship Between Federal Income Tax Laws and Cy Pres in
the Context of Mass Solicitations for Charitable Contributions
The foregoing discussion has laid the foundation for exploring the
frontiers of the cy pres doctrine, and the common law of restricted
gifts more generally, in relationship to the federal income tax laws
discussed above. These frontiers will be explored in responding to the
following questions:
(1) In a state that recognizes the cy pres doctrine, when, if at all,
may a court authorize the charitable donee to depart from the terms
of restricted gifts solicited from the public if literal compliance with
such terms would jeopardize the donee's exemption from federal
income taxation?
(2) In a state that recognizes the cy pres doctrine, when, if at all,
does a charity jeopardize its federal income tax exemption by
returning publicly solicited restricted donations to donors without
having obtained direction from a court to do so?
(3) In a state that does not recognize cy pres, may a charitable
donee return publicly solicited restricted gifts to donors when
complying with such terms would jeopardize the donee's exemption
from federal income taxation?
(4) Under what circumstances are contributors to a charitable
organization that publicly solicited funds for a restricted charitable
purpose not entitled to a charitable contribution deduction under
Code section 170?
This section addresses each question in turn.
To facilitate analysis, these questions will be discussed in the
context of a common fact pattern. Assume a hurricane, taking a
course that narrowly bypasses several major metropolitan coastal
cities, destroys a very small town on the Eastern seaboard. Grateful
that they were spared from the hurricane's fury, and eager to extend a
helping hand to the people of the small town who weathered the
storm, thousands of city dwellers generously respond to a local
charity's plea for assistance. The charitable donee represented to the
public in all of its solicitations that all donations would be used
exclusively to provide direct financial assistance to the victims of the
storm.
Accordingly, under the case law discussed above, the
prevailing view is that the charitable donee holds such donated funds
subject to the legal restriction that they be used as promised. Let us
further assume that donations were so extensive that the charity
received more than enough money to meet the emergency needs of
the victims, and to rebuild adequate housing and business
establishments for them. The charity is thus faced with deciding what
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to do with the surplus funds. Let us also assume that transferring the
surplus directly to the victims would significantly enhance their prehurricane standard of living. Because of the significant private benefit
associated with transferring the surplus funds to the victims, it is quite
conceivable that any such transfer would cause the local charity to
forfeit its federal income tax exemption. So what can the charity do?
a. The First Question: When Does Cy Pres Apply?
Turning to the first question raised above, we must consider the
applicability of the cy pres doctrine to the hypothetical facts.
Specifically, in a jurisdiction that recognizes the cy pres doctrine, can
our hypothetical charity petition a court to authorize deviation from
the terms of the restricted gifts solicited from the public because
literal compliance with such terms would jeopardize the donee's
exemption from federal income taxation? It will be recalled that
under the cy pres doctrine, a court may direct the application of
charitable trust funds to purposes similar to the original trust purposes
when accomplishing the latter is or becomes impossible,
impracticable, or illegal, provided that the transferor of the funds has
manifested an intent to devote the fund to charitable purposes more
general than the frustrated specific purpose of the gift. 2 ' Under the
hypothetical facts, the case law supports the conclusion that the funds
received by the charity in response to its solicitations probably would
constitute restricted gifts. Strictly speaking, compliance with the
terms of the restricted gifts described in the hypothetical would not
necessarily be "illegal." Generally, the requirements of Code section
501(c)(3) (such as not running afoul of the private benefit doctrine or
the private inurement doctrine) are not mandated for any
organization. 21
Rather, they are requisites for obtaining and
maintaining federal income tax exemption. An organization may
operate "legally" and still fail to satisfy Code section 501(c)(3), 21 just
as a person may legally make an expenditure that fails to qualify for
an income tax deduction. In other words, it is conceivable that a
charity may "legally" engage in activities that result in the loss of its
federal income tax exemption. 12 Moreover, compliance with the
126. See supra Part l.A.2.b.
127. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2001).
128. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592-605 (1983)
(holding that a private school that denied admissions to, and expelled, students who
engaged in or advocated interracial dating was not entitled to federal income tax
exemption because such actions violated established national public policy against
numerous forms of racial discrimination in education).
129. On the other hand, one could argue that engaging in activities that result in
the loss of a charitable organization's income tax exemption is "illegal" if either (i)
the action is contrary to the charitable organization's articles of incorporation (or
other governing document), or (ii) the governing board's authorization of the action
constitutes a breach of their fiduciary duties to the corporation. Because cy pres
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terms of the restricted gifts described in the hypothetical would not
technically be "impossible.'.'
The charitable donee is capable of
identifying every victim and transferring to each a share of all
donations raised.
A stronger case supporting the potential application of cy pres to
the facts raised in the hypothetical would rest on grounds of
impracticability. As a threshold matter, it should be recalled that
cases such as Kerner v. Thompson' and Sharpless v. Medford
Monthly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends'3 2 have applied cy
pres to funds considered "excessive" quite apart from any federal
income tax ramifications to the charitable donees.'3 3 The problem of
relying on these cases in situations like that raised in the hypothetical
is the difficulty of determining whether the restrictions governing the
publicly solicited gifts imply some level of gifts above which a court
will be able to find the existence of "excess." If donors really intend
that their contributions be transferred to or for the benefit of the
victims of the small coastal town in our hypothetical, even if the
victims thereby become wealthy, a court would be hard-pressed to
find that any such funds constitute "surplus" apart from federal
income tax considerations. I believe that a sensible approach for
guiding a court in determining whether cy pres applies is to factor the
federal income tax implications to the charitable donee into the
analysis. Many, if not most, charitable donees that engage in public
solicitations for funds rely heavily for their survival not only upon
their own exemption from federal income taxes, but also upon the
deductibility under Code section 170 of contributions made to them.
A donee that violates the public benefit doctrine not only forfeits its
income tax exemption, but also loses the benefit of receiving taxdeductible donations. 34 For many charities, failing to qualify under
should potentially apply on grounds of impossibility or impracticability, this issue
need not be resolved at this time.
'130. Some charitable donees may have a credible argument that cy pres should
apply on grounds of impossibility when compliance with the terms of a restricted gift
would confer excessive private benefit. This argument would be available to a
charitable organization having a governing organizational document (i.e., articles of
incorporation, or whatever other document serves as its charter) that prohibits the
charity from operating for the benefit of private parties. The charity could argue that
complying with a restriction that would result in a violation of the private benefit
doctrine is "impossible" because doing so contravenes its corporate charter. Some
precedent supports the application of cy pres on grounds of impossibility when
compliance with the terms of the restricted gift would violate the corporate charter of
the donee. See, e.g., Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep, 170 A.2d 39,46-48 (N.J. 1961).
131. 13 N.E.2d 110 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938), discussed supra notes 52-63 and
accompanying text.
132. 548 A.2d 1157 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), discussed supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
133. Id. at 1161.
134. The language of Code section 170(c)(2)(B) mirrors the corresponding
language of Code section 501 (c)(3).
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Code section 501(c)(3) would result in their dissolution. In such
situations, a reasonable conclusion is that compliance with the
restricted terms of publicly solicited gifts is "impracticable."''3 5 Thus,
when a court is petitioned to redirect the disposition of restricted gifts
on the grounds that compliance with the restrictions would jeopardize
the charitable donee's federal income tax exemption, the court should
find that the cy pres doctrine applies, if the funds were donated with
the requisite general charitable intent. Although this conclusion is
entirely sensible, there is little judicial precedent to support it.'36
Moreover, the italicized phrase of the preceding paragraph presents
no small difficulties. As has been observed previously, courts have
reached inconsistent results in determining whether donors of publicly
solicited funds had general charitable intent in addition to the specific
intent to further the restricted charitable purpose of the gifts.'37
Should the court hear evidence of the intent of each and every donor
whose testimony is available? Should the court limit its inquiry to an
analysis of the terms of the charitable donee's solicitation materials?
Should the court presume general charitable intent because the
average donor in a massive fundraising campaign would not expect a
return of her contribution? Alternatively, should the court presume
an absence of general charitable intent because the donee alone wrote
the solicitation materials, and therefore the donee should not be
allowed to depart at all from specified terms absent compelling
evidence of donor intent to the contrary? Existing authorities do not
provide us with clear, consistent answers. This predicament is
135. Some courts have been persuaded that when the failure to apply cy pres would
threaten the continued existence of the donee, the doctrine should be applied. See,
e.g., Sharpless, 548 A.2d at 1160; In re Estate of Othmer, 710 N.Y.S.2d 848, 852-53
(Surr. Ct. 2000). These courts reason that donors generally would not want to see
their intended purpose thwarted by the cessation of operations of the charitable
donee. This rationale makes good sense when the restricted gift is expected to remain
with the charity in perpetuity, or at least for a great length of time. Unfortunately,
that rationale does not apply as forcefully to our hypothetical charity. The charitable
donee described in the hypothetical could literally comply with the restricted terms of
the gifts by distributing all contributed funds to the victims, and then forfeit its income
tax exemption. If donors lacked general charitable intent, they might be perfectly
happy with this result. The real doctrinal issue, then, is whether the donors had
merely a specific intent to benefit the victims of the hurricane, or the more general
intent to further charity.
136. Some support for this position arguably appears in decisions of courts that
have applied cy pres following changes in federal income tax law (although many of
these cases are decided under the doctrine of equitable deviation, rather than under
cy pres). For example, in Arner Estate, 65 Pa. D. & C.2d 421, 422 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1974),
a trust was established to pay the nursing home admission fee of one person selected
in the future by a local church. According to the court, the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
coupled with changed economic conditions, rendered the trust "impractical of
fulfillment." Id. at 424-25. Thus, the court approved the termination of the trust, and
the transfer of trust assets to the restricted endowment fund of the nursing home, to
be used for purposes very similar to those designed by the settlor. See id. at 425.
137. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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attributable not only to the inherent vagaries of the cy pres doctrine,
but also to the doctrine's awkward application to publicly solicited
restricted gifts. Some mechanism, be it judicial or legislative reform of
the doctrine or some other creative initiative, is necessary to increase
the predictability of legal outcomes in this area.
b. The Second Question:Does ReturningDonationsJeopardize the
Donee's FederalIncome Tax Exemption in a Cy Pres Jurisdiction?
Assuming that the jurisdiction recognizes the cy pres doctrine,
when, if at all, does a charity jeopardize its federal income tax
exemption by returning publicly solicited restricted donations to
donors without having obtained direction from a court to do so?
Consider the hypothetical charity raising excessive funds for hurricane
victims. Let us assume that the charity astutely recognizes that
distributing all funds would jeopardize its federal income tax
exemption because doing so would confer more than incidental
private benefit. Let us also assume that the charity wishes to avoid
the legal fees and court costs of a judicial cy pres proceeding, as well
as the negative adverse publicity that may arise from petitioning a
court to depart from the restrictive terms of the solicited gifts. In an
effort to appease donors who might object to the use of funds for any
purpose other than that advertised in the charity's solicitation
materials, the donee returns all excess donations to people who made
gifts to the donee within a specified time frame following the
hurricane, on a pro rata basis. Is the refund of such excess donations
problematic?
Under current law, any such refund presents a private benefit
problem. It will be recalled that under the cy pres doctrine, a donor
owns a reversionary interest in a restricted gift only if he lacks general
charitable intent. As discussed above, according to significant judicial
authority, the funds received by the charity from the general public
are restricted gifts. The relevant question is therefore whether the
donors of the gifts had general intent to further charity, or only the
specific intent to aid the hurricane victims of the small town. Under
the traditional cy pres doctrine, this question must be answered by a
court because a charity has no authority to determine the existence
(or non-existence) of general charitable intent by itself.
Let us assume that the charity erroneously determines that the
donors lacked general charitable intent prior to returning the excess
contributions. Or even worse, the charity does not even think about
the issue, and simply returns the surplus donations, notwithstanding
the donors' general charitable intent. Because the donors had general
charitable intent, they were not entitled to receive any surplus funds
from the charity under the cy pres doctrine. In addition to whatever
liability may be imposed by state law on the trustees of the charitable
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organization for breaching their fiduciary duties, the organization
itself may lose its exemption from federal income taxation. When the
organization erroneously refunds surplus funds to donors, it directly
confers an economic benefit (money) upon private parties. The
return of the donations differs little from a charity's decision to dole
out cash to a crowd of people without regard to their need for
assistance.13 The larger the surplus, the greater the probability that
Moreover,
this private benefit is not quantitatively incidental.
because a charity may handle surplus restricted gifts more responsibly
by other means (such as by seeking a court order for the disposition of
the funds, or by carefully providing for their disposition in
communications to donors ex ante), it is doubtful that the private
benefit conferred through the return of the excess funds is
qualitatively incidental. 13 9
c. The Third Question: When May DonationsJeopardizingFederal
Income Tax Exemption Be Returned in a Non-Cy Pres Jurisdiction?
As indicated above, some states do not recognize the cy pres
doctrine. In those states, a third question is relevant: May a charitable
donee return publicly solicited restricted gifts to donors when
complying with the restrictive terms would jeopardize the donee's
exemption from federal income taxation? The legal analysis of this
issue is much the same as that applicable to the previous questions. In
states that do not recognize the cy pres doctrine, presumably a court
must decide only whether the original restricted purpose no longer
may be fulfilled; if so, donors are entitled to the return of excess
funds. I would urge the courts in such states to adopt the position that
when compliance with the original restricted purpose of the gifts
would jeopardize the federal income tax exemption of the charitable
donee, the donee is not bound to comply with such restrictions. In
these states, the consequence of such a determination is that the
donors would be entitled to receive the surplus funds.
Under current law, however, a charity in such a state should not
unilaterally decide to refund excess restricted charitable donations.
138. A charitable organization might attempt to justify the return of excess
contributions under the theory that it is averting a costly lawsuit by donors who would
be dissatisfied if the charity failed to do so. This justification would appear quite
weak on the facts of the hypothetical. As discussed previously, most courts generally
hold that donors have no standing to sue (absent some special reserved interest).
Unless the charity reasonably believes that under state law donors likely have
standing to sue for a return of excess donations, refunding surplus funds without
obtaining court approval is unwise.
139. If, however, the donors lacked general charitable intent, no private benefit
theoretically arises from the return of surplus funds. In such a situation, the donors
are merely receiving the property to which they are entitled under state law. Of
course, under the cy pres doctrine, a court, not the charitable donee, is the proper
authority to decide the presence or absence of general charitable intent.
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Let us assume that the charity in our hypothetical fact pattern
concludes that transferring additional funds to or for the benefit of the
hurricane victims would confer excessive private benefit upon them.
If the charity is correct, a court should order the return of the excess
funds to the donors. On the other hand, if the charity is mistaken, the
donors are not entitled to the funds thought to be excessive.
Refunding the funds erroneously thought to be excessive results in
private benefit to donors. For the reasons discussed above, such
benefit may be more than quantitatively incidental, and most certainly
is not qualitatively incidental. A charity that reaches the wrong
decision on this issue, and acts upon it, could forfeit its federal income
tax exemption.
d. The Fourth Question: When Are ContributionsDeductible?
When are taxpayers who have made gifts to a charitable
organization that publicly solicited restricted funds not entitled to a
charitable contribution deduction under Code section 170? The short
answer to this question is supplied by the Treasury regulations (and
the authorities interpreting them) discussed above.14 ° These donors
are entitled to deduct their charitable contributions unless the
possibility that an event requiring the return of their contributions
"appears on the date of the gift to be so remote as to be negligible."'4 1
In our hypothetical, the event that would require the return of
contributions is the receipt by the charitable donee of surplus
charitable gifts for hurricane relief, provided that if the charity is in a
cy pres jurisdiction, the donors had only specific charitable intent. As
discussed above, the determination of whether surplus funds exist (or,
stated alternatively in a cy pres jurisdiction, whether the distribution
of additional funds for the restricted purpose would be
"impracticable"), should be decided in part by determining whether
the distribution of such funds would give rise to non-incidental private
benefit (or to private inurement). Of course, other eventualities may
result in surplus funds, such as a simple determination that all of the
money that can be spent on the specified purpose has been spent (as
in the case of a completed building project).
The preceding paragraph helps illuminate the complexity of the
subtle interaction between the cy pres doctrine (or the law of
restricted charitable gifts in general) and federal income tax law. A
charity that receives funds through mass appeals to the general public
for a particular charitable project or function may often be held to
possess such funds as restricted gifts. In a jurisdiction recognizing cy
pres, the charitable donee may depart from the terms of such gifts
only if a court finds both that donors had general charitable intent,
140. See supra notes 94-109.
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(e) (2002).
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and that compliance with the restrictive terms of the gift is impossible,
illegal, or impracticable. Whether compliance with the terms of the
gift is "impracticable" should depend in part upon whether such
compliance would jeopardize the federal income tax exemption of the
charitable donee under the private benefit doctrine. If, at the time of
making the gifts, donors have only specific charitable intent, and if
there is more than a remote likelihood that the charitable donee will
be unable to comply fully with the terms of the restriction because
doing so would jeopardize the donee's federal income tax exemption
under the private benefit doctrine, donors will not be entitled to
deduct their contributions under Code section 170. Indeed, any time
there is more than a remote likelihood that the charitable donee will
be unable to comply fully with the terms of restricted gifts on account
of the receipt of excess funds, the propriety of a deduction under
section 170 is called into question. The same conclusion holds with
respect to taxpayers donating restricted gifts to a charity in a
jurisdiction that does not apply cy pres, quite apart from any inquiry
into the specificity of such taxpayers' intent.
Reflecting upon this analysis, one can appreciate the incredibly
difficult task of determining whether, and to what extent, a taxpayer
who makes a gift to charity in response to a mass solicitation for
restricted funds is entitled to claim a deduction for her contribution
under Code section 170. That charities actually have sought to depart
from the restrictive terms of such gifts should be evident from the
discussion to this point. In contrast, the proper approach for
determining the deductibility of these restricted charitable
contributions in an actual case is far from evident. How can an
individual taxpayer, much less the IRS or a court, accurately
determine, as of the date of the taxpayer's gift, whether the charity's
receipt of excess funds that will be returned to donors carries a risk
"so remote as to be negligible?"' 4 2 Can any single decision-maker
realistically make this determination, which hinges upon a
contingency often beyond the control of the charitable donee, as well
as any single donor? Further, even if one could predict the amount of
the excess charitable funds, should every contributing taxpayer be
permitted a partial deduction for her estimated pro rata contribution
to the restricted funds that are used for the specified purposes? Or, in
defiance of the principle that money is fungible, should the deduction
be disallowed in full because no taxpayer can trace her contribution to
the funds that are not refunded to donors? Should different rules of
deductibility apply depending on when each contribution is made
within a fundraising campaign for a specified purpose?
Existing authorities do not provide satisfying answers to these
questions. In the shadow of these difficulties, and unlike the approach
142. Id.
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of the IRS in Revenue Ruling 79-249,141 the law could simply abandon
all attempts to apply the Treasury regulations' rule of nondeductibility of gifts on account of non-remote contingencies in the
context of restricted charitable gifts solicited in mass appeals. While
this "solution" would make life easier for taxpayers, the IRS, and the
courts, it is probably not the best course of action. As explained
above, because of the time value of money, allowing a current-year
deduction for all such restricted gifts subject to contingencies is costly
to the government.
The rule of the Treasury regulations is
theoretically correct. The key is to devise a theoretically defensible
system that minimizes costs and simplifies administration.
C. Summary
Current law presents as many questions as answers in the attempt to
determine the proper distribution of surplus gifts received by a
charitable donee in a public appeal for donations for a particular
charitable purpose. At the outset, a court must decide whether an
appeal for funds to meet a specific need causes the attendant
charitable gifts to be legally restricted. Several cases have ruled that
such funds are restricted. If such funds are restricted for a particular
charitable purpose, a charity may not do whatever it pleases with
funds that it deems excessive, but must seek direction from a court. In
a jurisdiction that recognizes the cy pres doctrine, a court must first
determine whether a "surplus" of charitable gifts exists, such that
compliance with the restriction has become illegal, impossible or
impracticable. A good argument can be raised that a court should
find the requisite impracticability whenever compliance with the
terms of gifts would jeopardize the federal income tax exemption of
the donee (for whatever reason, including the private benefit
doctrine), but one finds little precedent on this issue. Further, even if
the court finds that compliance with the restriction would be
impracticable, cy pres will be applied only if donors are found to have
possessed general charitable intent.
How a court arrives at such a finding is most problematic.
Attempting to ascertain the intent of each and every donor
responding to a mass appeal for funds is often simply not practical,
although a pure cy pres analysis would require it. Consequently,
courts must resort to examining the terms of the appeal and its
surrounding circumstances to determine whether donors as a class had
a charitable intent more general than advancing the specific purpose
for which funds were solicited. In doing so, courts appear to adopt a
presumption, either explicitly or implicitly, that donors as a class did
or did not have general charitable intent. Courts have differed on the
presumption adopted, and there is no discernable basis for predicting
143. 1979-2 C.B. 104.
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which presumption (for or against general charitable intent) will be
adopted in any given case.
The difficulty in predicting when surplus funds will be returned to
donors presents yet another problem: determining whether a taxpayer
is entitled to a charitable contribution deduction for donations made
in restricted charitable gift campaigns.
The problem arises in
jurisdictions that apply the cy pres doctrine, as well as in those that do
not. A default rule that simply grants taxpayers a deduction in all
such cases is both theoretically unsound and potentially costly to the
government.
A solution to these complex problems is needed. The next section
of this article examines whether the solution may be found in existing
proposals for reforming the doctrine of cy pres.
II. WHY CY PRES REFORM PROPOSALS Do NOT ADEQUATELY
ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF DISPOSING OF EXCESS CHARITABLE
DONATIONS RECEIVED IN PUBLIC SOLICITATIONS

Numerous legal scholars have offered proposals for reforming the
doctrine of cy pres. Many of these scholars concern themselves with
the issue of "dead hand control" of sums donated to charity, and the
resulting efficiency losses that may be perpetuated by the traditional
doctrine of cy pres. Other scholars focus on particular elements of the
doctrine that have proven confusing, unworkable, or even illusory. At
least one has even questioned the theoretical justification for the
foundational rule that restricted charitable gifts are generally legally
enforceable. Some proposals from academics have been adopted by
state legislatures. Although analyzing each and every proposal for
reforming cy pres in detail is beyond the scope of this article, a brief
critical review of the most prominent of these proposals reveals that
the reform proposals are probably inadequate, or at least incomplete,
measures for adequately disposing of excess charitable funds received
through mass solicitations. This section of the article explains why
existing proposals for reforming cy pres are not well suited for solving
the problem of publicly solicited surplus funds donated to charity.
A.

Presume (or Abandon the Requirement for Finding) General
CharitableIntent
Professor Bogert advocated that in applying the doctrine of cy pres,
courts should presume that donors had general charitable intent, or
entirely dispense with the requirement of general charitable intent.144
Both the former145 and the latter 146 suggestions of Professor Bogert
144. Bogert, supra note 16, § 436. Similarly, section 413 of the Uniform Trust Code
presumes that a settlor had general charitable intent. Unif. Trust Code § 413, 7C
U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 2002).
145. Massachusetts now statutorily presumes general charitable intent by donors.
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have legislative parallels. Abandoning the requirement of finding
general charitable intent by donors would surely ease administrative
burdens on the courts. No longer would courts need to hear evidence
of whether donors as a class, or any particular donor, would prefer
that excess contributions be used for some. charitable purpose or
instead be returned to donors. Nor would judges expend valuable
time engaging in judicial hair-splitting between general charitable
intent and specific charitable intent when the evidence on the issue is
scant (as it often will be).
Similarly, adopting a presumption that donors responding to mass
solicitations for restricted charitable gifts had general charitable intent
not only finds some judicial support,'47 but also would tend to reduce
the evidentiary burden on courts necessitated by a pure cy pres
analysis (which theoretically requires an examination of evidence
bearing upon how every donor actually would -have preferred to
dispose of her donation that could not be used precisely as initially
intended). By adopting a presumption in favor of general charitable
intent, courts could apply cy pres to surplus funds raised in mass
solicitations unless the evidence plainly indicates that donors lacked
general charitable intent. In most public appeals for funds by
charities, it is doubtful that such evidence would often suffice to rebut
the presumption in favor of general charitable intent. Most donors
responding to public appeals for gifts probably either make no specific
statement as to the desired use of donated funds, or simply note on
their donations made by check the purpose identified by the charity
for raising funds (such as "flood relief"). Such a notation of the
purpose of the gift would not alone suffice to rebut the presumption
of general charitable intent. Indeed, only if the solicitation by the
charitable donee expressly stated that contributions would be used
exclusively, and in all events, for the designated charitable purpose is
it likely that a court would find that the presumption of general
charitable intent is rebutted. 4 ' Thus, one would expect some gains in
judicial economy (relative to current law) if general charitable intent
is presumed, although greater gains in judicial efficiency likely would
result from altogether abandoning the requirement of finding general
charitable intent in applying cy pres.
Abandoning the requirement of finding general charitable intent
would also eliminate the possibility that restricted charitable
E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws, Ch. 12, § 8K (West 2002); Mass Ann. Laws, Ch. 12, § 8k (Law
Co-op 2000).
146. By statute, Pennsylvania has abandoned the requirement of general charitable
intent in applying the doctrine of cy pres. E.g., 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6110 (West
2002).
147. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
148. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399 cmt. c (1959) (stating that the mere
description of the charitable purpose of the gift with particularity does not necessarily
establish the absence of general charitable intent).
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contributions may be refunded to donors, unless the terms of the
restricted gifts expressly require the return of surplus funds.
Assuming that no such terms exist, no donor should be denied a
charitable contribution deduction under the special provision of the
Treasury regulations discussed above.149 Even if donations prove to
be excessive, they will be devoted to some charitable purpose (rather
than returned to donors), and therefore the charitable contribution
deduction is entirely appropriate. Taxpayers may comfortably claim
charitable contribution deductions, and the government need not
suffer the revenue loss associated with the claiming of deductions by
taxpayers for transfers that are later refunded.
Presuming that donors responding to mass solicitations for
restricted charitable gifts had general charitable intent tends to
decrease the probability that restricted charitable contributions may
be refunded to donors, unless the terms of the restricted gifts
expressly require the return of surplus funds. Assuming that no such
terms exist, a donor usually should have a strong argument that she
may claim a charitable contribution deduction for her publicly
solicited gift. Because in most cases one would not expect a court to
find evidence that rebuts the presumption of general charitable intent
in the context of public appeals for donations, the likelihood that any
donor would be entitled to a refund of a portion of her gift should
often be quite remote. In such circumstances, the Treasury regulation
discussed above does not operate to disallow the deduction under
Code section 170. Notwithstanding this analysis, it remains true that
the ultimate inquiry as to whether a restricted charitable gift is subject
to a non-remote contingency is factual and case-specific. Therefore,
the prospect that the presumption of general charitable intent may be
rebutted renders the deductibility of charitable contributions under
Code section 170 less conclusive than when the requirement of
general charitable intent is abandoned.
Although abandoning the requirement of general charitable intent,
or presuming general charitable intent, has the foregoing advantages
in judicial economy and the administration of the charitable
contribution deduction under federal income tax law, both
alternatives may also be criticized, particularly in the context of
restricted donations raised through mass solicitations. It is not clear
that either of these two proposals truly produces a net efficiency gain.
To understand why this is so, the analysis of Professor Jonathan
Macey will prove salutary. Macey argues that a regime governing
restricted charitable gifts will maximize societal welfare if it lowers the
error, transaction, and agency costs of creating trusts. 5 That system
"would provide maximum incentives to create wealth, and facilitate
149. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(e) (2002).
150. See Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37
Emory L.J. 295, 299 (1988).
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the creation of private trusts which provide for the creation of
significant public goods." '51
Error costs include those costs attributable to mistakes in drafting
and interpreting the terms of the governing donative instruments.
Transaction costs are those associated with drafting the terms of the
donative instrument precisely as intended by the donor (including
provisions dealing with contingencies).
Agency costs are those
associated with monitoring and controlling those responsible for
administering the trust following its establishment.'52
How "costly" by these standards is the proposal to presume that
donors had general charitable intent, or to dispense entirely with the
requirement of general charitable intent, in the case of publicly
solicited funds? Let us first consider transaction costs. It will be
recalled that when a charity solicits funds from the general public for a
restricted purpose, the "donative instrument" that sets forth the
restrictions is really the solicitation itself. Thus, the charity is typically
the primary drafter of the donative instrument. If one considers the
transaction costs to the charity alone, the proposal to presume general
charitable intent by donors (or to dispense entirely with the
requirement of general charitable intent) would not be costly. Indeed,
a charity's silence as to what disposition is to be made if surplus funds
are raised will suffice for many charities.'53 However, one must not
lose sight of whose intent as to the disposition of gifts is critical-that
of the donors, not just that of the charitable donee. The inquiry
should not look primarily to the minimal transaction costs of this
proposal to charitable donees, but to the transaction costs incurred by
the mass of contributors to charity.
The extent of these transaction costs to donors depends in part
upon their intent. Let us first assume that donors as a class would
prefer that the charity retain surplus funds and use them for some
charitable purpose to be chosen by someone other than the donors,
rather than return the surplus donations to them. If this assumption is
correct, transaction costs to donors are low under the proposal to
presume that donors had general charitable intent, or to dispense
entirely with the requirement of general charitable intent. They can
simply respond to the solicitation in silence, assured that there is no
need to speak.
But let us assume that many donors care greatly about the use of
surplus funds. If donors would actually prefer to receive a refund of
their share of a surplus, for example, they would be required to
condition their gifts on such terms. As a practical evidentiary matter,
151. Id. at 299.
152. See id. at 298 & n.7, 299.
153. Silence will often suffice for the donees because if they say nothing, they will
usually be entitled to keep donations, even if they must go to court for an alternative
disposition of surplus funds under cy pres.

1868

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

a donor would need to express this condition in writing. While the
transaction costs of specifying that any surplus funds must be returned
to one donor should be low, the costs increase as the number of
donors desiring a refund of their share of the surplus increases,
especially if these donors seek legal advice so as to ensure the desired
consequences. Moreover, if donors do not desire a refund of any
surplus, but instead prefer to retain the right to specify an alternative
charitable use for their share of the surplus, the transaction costs of
drafting instruments to effectuate these legal results donor-by-donor
would be very high indeed.
Because of the expected high transaction costs associated with
conditioning a gift on a return of any surplus, one may reasonably
expect that most donors who give in response to public solicitations
will not incur the costs of expressing their desired disposition of any
surplus in writing. One may also reasonably posit that many donors
are, and will continue to be, unaware of the legal effect of a charitable
donee's receipt of surplus gifts following a campaign for donations,
and that many donors also will be unaware of the significance of a
presumption of general charitable intent (or, in the alternative, of the
significance of abandoning the requirement of finding such intent
before applying the cy pres doctrine). But even when, for one or
more of these reasons, donors avoid the transaction costs of
expressing their desires for the disposition of surplus funds, it is
conceivable that error costs will be high.
As in the case of transaction costs, the extent of these error costs to
donors depends in part upon their intent. If we assume that donors as
a class would prefer that the charity retain surplus funds and use them
for some charitable purpose to be chosen by someone other than the
donors, there are no error costs associated with a presumption of
general charitable intent (or with abandoning the requirement of
general charitable intent). Under such an assumption, a court does
not commit "error" in applying cy pres. But if we assume that, but for
the transaction costs associated with expressing their wishes more
particularly, or but for their ignorance of the law, donors would
express their intent as to the disposition of surplus funds in a manner
that differs from the disposition resulting solely from the solicitation
materials publicized by charitable donees, we would expect error costs
to be high.
It should also be observed that abandoning the requirement of
general charitable intent, or presuming general charitable intent,
probably does little to decrease agency costs (i.e., the costs of
monitoring and controlling the trustees and directors of charitable
donees) associated with the current legal regime governing restricted
gifts. Certainly, the proposal does not directly do so. True, one could
argue that because judicial time and energy will no longer be wasted
in trying to discern the presence of general charitable intent under the
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traditional application of the doctrine of cy pres, more judicial time
can be devoted to framing an alternative disposition of surplus funds,
and therefore proposals for such dispositions by charities perhaps
would receive heightened judicial scrutiny.
Such a conclusion,
however, is highly speculative, and any benefits from such scrutiny
seem rather attenuated.
Three other comments are in order in assessing the relative merits
of the proposal to abandon the requirement of general charitable
intent, or to presume general charitable intent. First, the proposal
does not clarify whether the doctrine of cy pres may be applied when
doing so is necessary to prevent a charitable donee from forfeiting its
federal income tax exemption. Secondly, the proposal does not likely
provide charities soliciting funds with an incentive to maximize
disclosure to donors of how the charity plans to handle any surplus.
As argued below, ideally, charitable donees would communicate their
"contingency plans" for excess restricted gifts through their
solicitation materials sent to donors well in advance of receiving the
surplus. If charitable donees know that under the worst case scenario,
all they must do is petition a court for an alternative disposition of
restricted funds, they are probably less likely to concern themselves
with communicating with donors concerning donors' preferences as to
the disposition of excess funds. Finally, the proposal does nothing to
address the legal ramifications discussed above in the case of
restricted gifts made to a charitable donee in a jurisdiction that does
not recognize the cy pres doctrine.
B.

Presume No General CharitableIntent

A polar opposite approach to the problem would be to presume
that donors as a class have no general charitable intent. Charities
would be entitled to retain surplus restricted gifts only if the
solicitation materials plainly state that surplus funds may be used for
charitable purposes other than the restricted purpose designated in
the fundraising campaign. This approach is basically that suggested by
Professor Jonathan Macey, who has argued that the traditional cy pres
doctrine is no more efficient than a default rule under which property
transferred in trust for specified charitable purposes would revert to
the settlor's heirs "whenever any significant aspect of the settlor's
intentions are thwarted, unless the settlor provides for a contrary
result."'5 4 Like the first proposal, this alternative has both advantages
and disadvantages.
Presuming that donors lacked general charitable intent would tend
to reduce the evidentiary burden on courts necessitated by a pure cy
pres analysis (which entails an examination of all sorts of evidence
bearing upon whether donors would have preferred reversion or the
154. Macey, supra note 150, at 306.
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advancement of charity for some purpose other than that initially
intended). Unless the charitable solicitation materials plainly state
that funds raised for the specified purpose may not be so used in some
circumstances, it is unlikely that the presumption of no general
charitable intent would be rebutted. Without such a statement,
rebutting the presumption would likely require the admission of
evidence that donors informed the charitable donee in writing that it
could use the gifts however it so desired. Absent income tax
motivations,'5 5 donors would be unlikely to so inform the donee.
Thus, a court's review of the relevant evidence could be fairly limited.
Further, once a judge has found that the presumption of no general
charitable intent stands, she would not be required to spend additional
time framing an alternative scheme of disposition of charitable funds.
Accordingly, ignoring the implications of federal income taxation on
the behavior of taxpayers, one would expect some gains in judicial
economy (relative to current law) if courts presume the absence of
general charitable intent.
For reasons discussed above, one cannot be certain whether
presuming no general charitable intent would be associated with
higher transaction and error costs. The extent of these costs to donors
depends in part upon their intent. If we assume that donors as a class
would prefer that the charity retain surplus funds and use them for
some charitable purpose to be chosen by someone other than the
donors, rather than return the surplus donations to them, the proposal
of presuming no general charitable intent would tend to heighten
transaction costs to donors. They cannot simply respond to the
solicitation and rest in peace. They must either inform the donee that
it can keep the funds no matter what, send their contribution in some
manner that does not restrict the gift, or receive their refund and then
resubmit an undesignated gift to the charitable donee. If donors do
not wish to incur the transaction costs associated with these actions, or
if they simply are ignorant of the legal consequences of not taking
these actions, we would expect the presumption of no general
charitable intent to generate error costs-the costs of wrongly
returning to donors funds that they would prefer be retained by the
donee.
Of course, if we assume that donors care greatly about whether the
donee uses the funds for restricted purposes precisely as represented,
they can simply respond to the appeal for restricted funds in silence.
Doing so does not inherently generate transaction costs or error costs.
The effect of the presumption of no general charitable intent on
agency costs is more subtle. While one cannot be certain, it appears
that the presumption may tend to increase agency costs. Under the
traditional cy pres doctrine, a charitable donee who has received
155. See supra note 71.
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restricted gifts may petition a court for an alternative charitable
disposition of funds when the original purposes of the restricted gifts
have been accomplished (assuming the other elements of the doctrine
are established). The presumption of no general charitable intent
would tend to decrease the instances in which cy pres would be
applied. Thus, a charity that petitions a court for instructions is more
likely to find itself refunding gifts to donors. A charity then would be
faced with one of two choices: (i) determine that a surplus of
restricted gifts exists, petition a court for instructions as to the
disposition of the surplus, and incur a greater risk (relative to current
law) that the funds must be returned to donors; or (ii) expend as much
of the restricted funds as possible, thereby eliminating (or at least
reducing) the "surplus." The latter option may indeed amount to
charitable waste, but the charity may prefer waste to forfeiting the use
of the funds.
Certainly, a charity may not choose to expend restricted funds
wastefully if doing so subjects the trustees or directors to legal
liability, or jeopardizes the federal income tax exemption of the
charitable donee (for example, under the private benefit doctrine).'56
But there are numerous situations in which a charity can act
wastefully without practically subjecting itself or its governing board
to liability. For example, consider a charity that raises $10,000,000 for
a building that costs only $5,000,000 if built to the original
specifications. Under the traditional doctrine of cy pres, the charity
might well choose to implement its initial construction plans, and
petition a court for an alternative disposition of the excess donations.
If, however, the charity believes that a court would be likely to direct
a refund of the surplus $5 million to donors, the charitable
organization has an incentive to revise its plans and construct a
building that costs $10,000,000. After all, that additional $5 million
could be used not only to construct larger and more functional
facilities for providing charitable services, but also to build more
spacious, luxurious suites for officers and employees. Wasteful
expenditures of what otherwise would constitute a surplus may indeed
represent a form of agency cost. Such expenditures are not direct
costs of monitoring and controlling trustees and directors of charitable
organizations, but they are costs resulting from not being able to
control effectively those entrusted with administering charitable
organizations.
Moreover, at least in the context of publicly solicited gifts, the
federal income tax implications of presuming no general charitable
intent are troubling. Such a presumption tends to increase the
probability that restricted charitable contributions will be refunded to
donors. Relative to current law, a donor would have a weaker
156. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.

1872

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

argument that she may claim a charitable contribution deduction for
her publicly solicited gift. Because in most cases one would not expect
a court to find evidence that rebuts the presumption of no general
charitable intent in the context of pubic appeals for donations, the
likelihood that any donor would be entitled to a refund of a portion of
her gift may often not be so remote as to be negligible. In such
circumstances, the Treasury regulation discussed above disallows a
deduction under Code section 170. Of course, tax savvy donors would
eventually understand this problem, and therefore they could be
expected to make clear to charitable donees that they intend for the
donees to retain their contribution even if the donees receive surplus,
restricted gifts. However, expressing such general charitable intent
increases transaction costs incurred by these donors. In other words,
for donors who desire to maximize their success in claiming a
charitable contribution deduction for a restricted gift, a presumption
of no general charitable intent is more costly to them than either
current law or the presumption in favor of general charitable intent.
Two additional comments may help in evaluating the proposal to
presume the absence of general charitable intent. First, even if the
presumption is rebutted in a particular case, the proposal does not
clarify whether the doctrine of cy pres may be applied when doing so
is necessary to prevent a charitable donee from forfeiting its federal
income tax exemption. Secondly, the proposal does seem to provide
charities soliciting funds with an incentive to maximize disclosure to
donors of how the charity plans to handle any surplus. Charities have
the greatest control in casting the terms of an agreement concerning
restricted funds with donors, because charities write the solicitation
materials. A charity desiring to decrease the likelihood that surplus
funds will be returned to donors can plainly inform donors of how it
will use any surplus funds. Heightening such disclosure to donors,
however, does increase transaction costs to charitable donees.
Further, current law does not contain any effectual mechanism for
reducing such transaction costs associated with more extensive
disclosure.
C. Factor in Inefficiency as a Criterionfor Applying Cy Pres
Several scholars have proposed that courts apply the cy pres
doctrine more expansively by ordering a deviation from the original
purposes of the charitable trust or gift whenever compliance with such
purposes would be inefficient (sometimes expressed as "inexpedient"
or sub-optimal to society).'57 In other words, the traditional grounds
157. See, e.g., Lewis M. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 139 (1955)
(arguing that cy pres should apply if the amount to be devoted to the original trust
purposes is disproportionate to the associated value to society); Joseph A. DiClerico,
Jr., Cy Pres: A Proposalfor Change, 47 B.U. L. Rev. 153, 158, 166, 173, 175 (1967)
(arguing that cy pres should be applied when considerations of community benefit
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for applying cy pres-illegality, impossibility or impracticabilitywould be expanded to include inefficiency. Some of these scholars
would permit deviation in such cases only after the passage of a
substantial length of time following the effectuation of the charitable
transfer (such as the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities), 518
whereas others would not so limit the expansive use of the doctrine.
Applying cy pres when doing so would further charitable efficiency
is a major reform proposal that merits comprehensive analysis, an
enterprise beyond the scope of this article. Others have thoughtfully
critiqued the proposal, and some of the most significant objections are
summarized below. In addition, the proposal should be evaluated
more specifically in the context of publicly solicited gifts received for a
particular charitable purpose.
First, one should observe that incorporating inefficiency among the
several grounds for invoking a court's cy pres powers does not facially
address the problem of how to ascertain general charitable intent by
donors. Aware of this obvious point, some advocates of factoring in
the element of inefficiency in the cy pres analysis also recommend
adopting a "presumption [of] 'general charitable intent."'" 59 This
recommendation is not surprising. If we conclude that a court's
perception of charitable efficiency is a legitimate basis for deviating
from the express terms crafted by the donor regardless of how much
time has passed between the making of the gift and the filing of the
petition for cy pres,161 it must be because we believe that a court's
lead to the conclusion that compliance with the original terms of trust is inexpedient);
Sisson, supra note 26, at 651-53 (1988) (recommending expansion of the doctrine of cy
pres to include inefficiency (or at least inexpedience) as grounds for invocation); see
also Alex M. Johnson Jr. & Ross D. Taylor, Revolutionizing JudicialInterpretationof
Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational Contracts and Dynamic Interpretation to Cy
Pres and America's Cup Litigation, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 545, 571-86 (1989) (arguing that a
charitable trust is "the prototypical relational contract" characterized by parties with
limited foresight who simply cannot draft an instrument that completely specifies all
contingencies that may have a bearing on the use of charitable assets in the future;
urging courts to consider textual, historical and evolutive perspectives in interpreting
trust terms with flexibility, so that charitable assets can be used more optimally as
times change). Similarly, section 413 of the Uniform Trust Code authorizes a court to
apply cy pres when the original charitable purposes become "wasteful." Unif. Trust
Code § 413, 7C U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 2002)
158. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 26, at 355-56, 381-86 (1999) (proposing that
during the period governed by the Rule Against Perpetuities, the courts should
employ the traditional doctrine of cy pres, but thereafter the courts should be able to
order deviation from the settlor's express trust purposes when doing so more
optimally serves the settlor's intended purposes). Among those proposals for
liberalizing the doctrine of cy pres, Professor Johnson's suggestion of doing so only
after the expiration of the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities stands out as highly
cogent and insightful. His rationale deserves far more attention than the scope of this
article allows.
159. See, e.g., DiClerico, supra note 157, at 175.
160. As observed above, some reformers do not support deviation from the express
terms of trust when the gift was recently made, at least in some circumstances. See,
e.g., Johnson, supra note 26, at 381-86; Johnson & Taylor, supra note 157, at 580.
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assessment of how the community benefits most is more important
than how a donor intended her gift to be used for charitable
purposes."' If we decide that maximizing charitable efficiency is more
important than following a donor's intent, it would seem logically
inconsistent to require a probing inquiry into the donor's general
charitable intent as a prerequisite to the application of cy pres. Why
waste precious judicial resources in a difficult search for the probable
intention of a donor whose intent does not ultimately matter most? A
presumption of general charitable intent is therefore a natural
corollary to the proposal to incorporate inefficiency as one of the
grounds for applying cy pres. The relative merits of this presumption
have been discussed above, and will not be repeated in this section. 62
Including inefficiency among the several grounds for invoking a
court's cy pres powers does appear to have an advantage not
associated with the two reform proposals discussed above. The
proposal tends to support the application of cy pres when doing so is
necessary to prevent a charitable donee from forfeiting its federal
As
income tax exemption under the private benefit doctrine.
discussed previously, a violation of the private benefit doctrine occurs
when private persons benefit more than incidentally from the
activities of the charitable organization. The benefit received by
private persons must be incidental compared to the community
benefit generated by the charitable activity. Stated more pointedly,
an assessment of community benefit inheres in the private benefit
analysis. Because a court considering charitable efficiency in applying
cy pres is, by definition, inquiring into the community benefit
associated with the restrictive terms of charitable gifts, as well as the
community benefit that would result from an alternative disposition of
funds, a court that concludes that compliance with the restrictive
terms of publicly solicited gifts would violate the private benefit
doctrine should also conclude that cy pres may be applied to redirect
the charitable gifts to another purpose. Thus, although a credible case
under current law can be made for applying cy pres to surplus funds
raised through a public solicitation for restricted gifts when necessary
to avoid the donee's loss of income tax exemption under the private
benefit doctrine, a very compelling case for cy pres in such
circumstances can be made under the proposal to incorporate
charitable inefficiency as an element of the cy pres analysis.
There are also disadvantages of the proposal (or at least reasons to
question it). Most apparent are the added administrative costs
incurred by the judiciary in hearing and evaluating evidence as to the
community benefits (i.e., the charitable efficiency) of following or
161. Some advocates of liberalizing cy pres would respect a settlor's express terms
of trust that forbid the application of cy pres in all events. See, e.g., Johnson & Taylor,
supra note 157, at 575.
162. See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.

20031

CHARITABLE GIFTS

1875

deviating from the express terms of charitable gifts. Courts would be
required to consider far more evidence than they are currently
constrained to assess under the traditional doctrine of cy pres.
Moreover, as Professor Rob Atkinson has argued, that courts can
determine the most efficient use of charitable assets is debatable. 16 3
The proposal could also lead to especially undesirable results
specifically in the case of publicly solicited funds for restricted
charitable purposes. Unless the proposal is limited to gifts that were
made long before the petition for cy pres is filed (a limitation
suggested by Professor Alex Johnson)," a rule that charities (with
court approval) may depart from the terms of publicly solicited
restricted gifts could have a major dampening effect on charitable
giving. It is one thing to permit deviation when doing so is necessary
to prevent the charitable donee from violating the private benefit
doctrine, jeopardizing its federal income tax exemption, and thereby
risking its very existence. It is quite another thing to permit a
charitable donee in receipt of publicly solicited restricted gifts to
petition a court for another charitable use of funds simply on the
grounds that a more "efficient" charitable use has been discovered.
The most rational explanation for solicitations for restricted charitable
gifts from the general public is that the charitable donee believes that
it will raise more money if the contributing public realizes that funds
will be used for the specified purposes. If the law permits charities to
petition a court for an alternative use of such funds (perhaps for a use
that does not have wide public approval) on the grounds that such use
is more efficient, those donors who would have given less (or nothing
at all) to the donee had the solicitation materials not restricted the use
of donations will have no legal assurance that their donations will be
used as intended. Unless such donors can be assured adequately
through non-legal forces that a donee will not employ a "bait and
switch" policy with respect to restricted gifts, one would expect them
to give less to charity (or at least less to that charitable donee) under
the proposal.
Some proponents of including inefficiency among the grounds for
applying cy pres have argued that doing so may actually appeal to
donors, who would prefer that their gifts be used efficiently.1 65
163. Atkinson argues that cy pres reform typically assumes that there is a method
for determining charitable efficiency (i.e., the best use of a charitable dollar). See
Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 Hast. L.J. 1111, 1134 (1993). Atkinson
alleges that not only does such a method not exist, but also expanding cy pres in the
manner suggested by reformers could result in "standardless modification of
charitable trusts." Id.; see also id. at 1135-42 (arguing that there is no good measure
of efficiency in this context and that permitting the courts to determine charitable
efficiency will ensure no clear standards for doing so).
164. See supra note 158.
165. For example, Professor Johnson argues that a settlor would likely prefer to
have donated assets "put to their best use, as measured by the current state of
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Whatever the force of this argument as applied to gifts made long
before the filing of the petition for cy pres, it is less persuasive in the
case of publicly solicited restricted gifts. 6 A living donor can choose
among numerous charitable causes to support. A donor who has
responded to a public solicitation for funds to be devoted to a
specified charitable purpose presumably does so because he prefers to
subsidize precisely that cause. 6 7 A donor who wants someone else to
select the charitable use to which his donation will be used could be
expected to donate sums to a charitable grant-making organization
that supports multiple causes, such as a community foundation or the
United Way. Alternatively, at a minimum, if the donor did not want
to restrict the use of his funds for the specified purpose, he could be
expected to contribute sums to the donee for its general charitable
purposes. The more plausible position is that those who donate to a
charitable donee seeking funds for a specified purpose prefer that the
donee generally not decide, on its own accord or with the approval of
a court, on an alternative use of donations under the banner of
charitable efficiency.
Under this analysis, if the law were changed to include inefficiency
among the grounds for applying cy pres, we should expect either
transaction costs or error costs to increase in the context of publicly
solicited funds for a restricted purpose. Because the typical donor
probably would not want the charitable donee to be permitted to
depart from the terms of the restrictions simply on grounds of
inefficiency, she may expressly condition her gift on the donee's
agreement not to seek an alternative charitable use of her donation
upon a determination that such use is thought to be more efficient. If
every donor takes the time (or hires legal counsel) to so condition her
affairs," rather than having them tied up in the original purposes of the trust.
Johnson, supra note 26, at 385; see also Sisson, supra note 26, at 650 (speculating that
prospective donors might actually be encouraged to give if they could be assured that
their donated funds would be used efficiently in the future).
166. Some advocates of including inefficiency among the grounds for applying cy
pres recognize that doing so makes little sense in the case of recent gifts. See, e.g.,
Johnson, supra note 26, at 379-80.
It would be ludicrous to apply an expansive view of cy pres to a charitable
trust one year after it is established, just as it is similarly ill-advised to hew
strictly to the settlor's intent 200 years after the settlor's death. Time
inexorably causes the interests to be benefited or represented in the trust to
change.
Id.
167. In the terms of an economist, such donors likely derive significant "result
utility" from their gifts. Professors Mark Hall and John Colombo have nicely
explained the economics literature that distinguishes between a donor's "act utility"
and her "result utility." See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory
of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 1379, 1407-1.0 (1991). A donor
receives act utility merely from the activity of donating to charity (perhaps from a
sense of self-righteousness), without regard to whether the charitable donee uses the
donation for the social good. See id. at 1407. In contrast, a donor's result utility is her
satisfaction derived "by bettering some social condition." Id.
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gift expressly and in writing, donors as a class would incur significant
transaction costs. Certainly, some donors may decide not to incur
such transaction costs because they exceed the benefit to such donors
of ensuring that donated funds will not be redirected. Other donors
may simply be ignorant of the legal consequences of the proposal to
incorporate inefficiency among the grounds for applying cy pres.
Notwithstanding that donors in both cases will avoid incurring greater
transaction costs, error costs will increase, because the intent of such
donors will not be effectuated.
Thus, the proposal to invoke cy pres when compliance with the
original restricted purposes of a gift would be inefficient is quite
problematic as applied to publicly solicited funds restricted for a
charitable purpose. Although the proposal purports to promote
economic efficiency, it may very well lead to the inefficient reduction
in charitable contributions made in response to mass appeals for
donations. Even if the proposal does not do so, it would likely be
associated with high transaction or error costs. Further, the proposal
would impose additional burdens (and costs) on the judiciary.
D. Abandon Legal Enforcement of Restrictions on CharitableGifts
One of the most creative and thoughtful proposals for overhauling
the doctrine of cy pres has been suggested by Professor Rob
Atkinson. 6 ' Rejecting proposals to liberalize (i.e., to expand the
grounds for applying) the doctrine, Atkinson argues that a better
approach would be to "[e]liminate legal enforcement of dead hand
control and leave the disposition of charitable assets to the discretion
'
of their trustees."169
Atkinson's argument rests in part on the theory
that non-legal sanctions imposed by donors will prevent charities from
routinely dishonoring the terms of restricted gifts, and therefore
donors will not be unduly discouraged from making charitable gifts.'
Faced with the threat of losing future donations and incurring
damages to their own reputations, trustees of charitable donees could
be expected to continue to honor commitments to donors, at least
those that seem to carry present moral force.'71
168. See Atkinson, supra note 163.
169. Id. at 1115-16. Professor Atkinson's views on the enforcement of charitable
gifts follow from his broader conception of how the charitable sector does and should
operate. For an excellent discussion of this conception, which Professor Atkinson
refers to as the "sectarian model," see Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else)
Should Enforce the Duties of CharitableFiduciaries?,1998 J. Corp. L. 655, 686-99.
170. For a thorough discussion of why people in commercial contexts use nonlegal
sanctions, and the legal regulation of parties in this context, see David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships,104 Harv. L. Rev. 373 (1990).
171. See Atkinson, supra note 163, at 1124-34. Atkinson's argument that trustees
are not likely to disregard donors' wishes routinely because of the consequential
damage to their own reputations borrows from the scholarship of Professor Macey.
See Macey, supra note 150, at 320.
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As a threshold matter, it should be observed that this proposal
would eliminate most of the federal income tax concerns raised
previously. Donors would have no legal right to a refund of their
restricted contributions if the restricted purposes fail (or if the charity
simply decides to use the donations for other purposes), so donors
generally should be entitled to claim a deduction under Code section
170 for their contributions when made. Further, because a charity
would not be legally bound by restrictions imposed on gifts, a
charitable donee would clearly be able to divert the donated funds to
another purpose if necessary to avoid a violation of the private benefit
doctrine (and the consequent loss of federal income tax exemption).
Moreover, the proposal would eliminate burdens on the judiciary
and related litigation costs. Not only would courts no longer expend
time struggling to ascertain whether donors had general charitable
intent, but also courts would not even need to consider whether the
other elements of the cy pres doctrine-illegality, impossibility and
impracticability-justify a departure from the original purposes of the
gifts. The removal of cy pres proceedings from dockets would of
course also eliminate the private legal fees associated with such
petitions, as well as the costs incurred by the state attorneys general in
appearing in such actions and evaluating the merits of such cases. On
the other hand, we would expect the costs of non-legal enforcement
mechanisms to increase if the enforcement of charitable gifts were
abolished, so whether there is a net efficiency gain on account of cost
reduction is unclear.
What effect the proposal of abandoning legal enforcement of
restricted charitable gifts would have on charitable giving is an
intriguing question, especially in the case of publicly solicited funds
for a restricted purpose. The proposal would seem justified under the
following conditions: (i) information on how a donee has used (and
can continue to use) contributions is available, complete and accurate;
(ii) donors (and potential donors) will be provided such accurate,
complete information; (iii) donors (and potential donors) perceive
that such information is complete and accurate; (iv) the costs of
ensuring that the first three conditions exist are not excessive relative
to the costs of the current legal regime; and (v) the "community" in
which the trustees have a reputation that matters to them includes
many of the donors (or potential donors) who respond to public
solicitations for restricted funds, or at least people who empathize
with such donors.
The first condition may be satisfied, at least if the charitable donee's
financial statements are audited by an independent accounting firm.'
172. Of course, as illustrated by the recent Enron fiasco, even an audit by an
independent accounting firm does not ensure that the reporting entity has provided
accurate financial statements.
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Someone within the charitable organization (namely, a clerical
employee) should be recording accurately how funds have been
expended.
Similarly, someone (an employee or officer)
knowledgeable of the donee's affairs should know whether the
continued use of charitable funds for the restricted purpose is
"practicable" (as the concept is understood under the traditional cy
pres doctrine).
The second and third conditions are more problematic. Intuitively,
one would expect charitable donees to communicate more extensively
with donors concerning the use of donated funds under the proposal
to abandon legal enforcement of restrictions on gifts, for such
communication would be necessary to instill confidence in donors that
funds have been, and will be, properly used. Such communication
between donors and donees is actually a positive factor in the abstract.
Good communication between donors and donees may lead to more
stable relationships between the two, thereby increasing long-term
commitments to advancing charitable causes and facilitating the
exchange of ideas for better serving the public in the future. The
notion that such communication will be constructive, however, must
not be taken for granted. The information conveyed by charities in a
world in which restrictions are not legally enforced will be somewhat
suspect.
More precisely, accurate information on how a donee has used
contributions will likely be communicated to donors, at least if they
request it, if the donee has arranged for an audit of its financial
statements (assuming that the auditors report favorably upon such
statements). If the donee has not arranged for an independent audit
of its financial statements, or if the auditor's report suggests reporting
abnormalities, we have no assurance that information pertaining to
the use of restricted contributions is accurate. Accurate and complete
information on how a donee can continue to use restricted
contributions arguably is even less likely to be communicated to
donors under the proposal to abandon legal enforcement of restricted
gifts, regardless of whether the donee has arranged for an
independent audit of its financial statements. Consider a donee that
sincerely has determined that there is a superior use for funds that
were donated for a restricted charitable purpose. If the donee has
reason to believe that the donating public may disagree with its
assessment of the relative utility of the alternative disposition of
funds, the donee will surely be tempted to represent to donors that the
continued use of charitable funds for the restricted purpose has
become "impracticable," in an effort to appease donors who
otherwise would be disgruntled over the redirection of restricted gifts.
A donee that is not legally bound to comply with donors' restrictions
may have much less difficulty making its case for "impracticability" to
the donating public than it would in making its case to a court. A
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typical donor responding to a mass appeal for contributions simply is
not likely to be willing to spend a great deal of time and intellectual
energy testing the merits of a donee's assessment of impracticability,
particularly if the donor has not contributed a large sum.'7 3 Although
a donor of a large gift may have a significant incentive to make certain
that her donation was used as intended, donors of small sums are in
many cases unlikely to expend great efforts monitoring the donee.
For such donors, monitoring the donee is simply too costly. The
donee controls the information, and it would be difficult for donors to
penetrate biased opinions, or even half-truths, carefully crafted by
1'
donees. 74
The problem arises in part because of the nature of the relationship
between trustees of charities and the public. In the words of Professor
Evelyn Brody, charitable trustees are in some sense agents without
principals.'
Their control of information contributes to this
phenomenon. Professor Brody explains as follows:
[T]he law grants plenary authority to the nonprofit board of
directors to manage the affairs of a nonprofit corporation. Those
who govern a nonprofit firm can exercise discretion to maximize
different goals. Because of the presumed information asymmetry
between the nonprofit and the patrons, the nondistribution
constraint alone cannot assure the patron that his donation ... will

achieve his intent. If the public cannot tell what is happening inside
the nonprofit, the patron cannot know whether the nonprofit is
using his or her money to maximize the quality of the charity's
services, to reduce their cost to the public, to augment pecuniary and
nonpecuniary compensation of the7 charity's workers, or even to save
for the benefit of future patrons. 6

173. It is not a sufficient answer to assert that charities will be sure to provide the

donating public with complete and accurate information because of the oversight
function of charitable "watchdog" organizations. These entities, limited by resources,
must be selective in their oversight. Moreover, it is not clear that such organizations
are necessarily the most reliable assessors of other charities; they, too, may rely on
donations for their existence, and their existence is never more justified (so it would
appear) than when they find that their targets have acted improperly. In contrast, a
court of law is not beholden to donors, and therefore is a more neutral overseer of
charitable entities.
174. Professor Atkinson has suggested precisely the opposite potential problem
with his proposal-namely, that charitable donees will behave too responsively to
donors in an effort to build a reputation for honoring donor-imposed restrictions.
See Atkinson, supra note 163, at 1152-53. I am unconvinced that Atkinson's proposal
would pose this asserted problem. Charitable donees would not necessarily be more
inclined to coddle donors under Atkinson's proposal than they already do under
current law. Under current law, donors are free to pursue just as many informal
enforcement tactics as they may pursue under Atkinson's proposal, and donees must
compete just as aggressively for donations.
175. Brody, supra note 23, at 463-64.
176. Id. at 466.
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The proposal to abandon enforcement of restrictions governing
charitable gifts appears to render these charitable agents even more
detached from the oversight of a principal than is the case under
current law. At least under current law, the threat of a lawsuit by the
state attorney general (however unlikely that may be), and the
resulting review of the trustees' actions by a court, provides some
additional check on trustees.
Problems with the second condition logically lead to problems with
the third condition described above. Because charities can be
expected to interpret, and perhaps sometimes even taint, the facts so
as to satisfy their preferences as to the disposition of "restricted"
funds, donors can be expected to doubt whether their "restricted"
contributions will actually be used exclusively for the intended
charitable purposes. One may predict two possible consequences.
First, some donors may curtail their charitable giving, for they realize
that their intended disposition of charitable funds may not occur.
Thus, the charitable sector may directly suffer. Alternatively, or
perhaps in addition, donors may establish new and more effective
"watchdog" organizations to monitor charities. Although doing so
may help alleviate some of the problems identified above, such
"watchdog" entities are not a panacea, 77 and creating and funding
them entails additional costs. This is another way of saying that the
agency costs of the proposal are likely quite high. How extensive
these costs would be (a proper inquiry given the fourth condition
listed above) is anybody's guess. This article does not attempt to
answer whether the costs of monitoring charities by those with no
legal powers over them will be greater or less than the costs of
monitoring charities under current law.
The proposal does likely fare satisfactorily under the fifth condition
set forth above. In the case of local or regional charities, the
'"community" in which the trustees have a reputation that matters
greatly to them likely does include many of the donors (or potential
donors) who respond to public solicitations for restricted funds. The
trustees can be expected to live, work, socialize, worship, and
volunteer in the same locality in which donations are solicited. In
general, trustees presumably care about their reputations in such
communities. In the case of national charities, trustees of charitable
organizations may not necessarily care about their reputations in
every locality from which funds are solicited. But trustees do
probably care about their national reputations. Because a local
scandal involving a charity with national operations may very well be
reported in the national media, it is no stretch to conclude that even
trustees of national charities care about their reputations enough to
attempt not to alienate donors who live in localities other than those
177. See supra note 173.
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in which the trustees live and work. Thus, to the extent accurate
information can be provided to donors, the desire of a trustee to
uphold her reputation in the community tends to constrain her from
deviating greatly from restrictions imposed by donors. Of course, this
does not alleviate the concerns raised in discussing the second and
third conditions, for there the concerns relate to informational
asymmetries.
A final observation on the proposal to abandon the legal
enforcement of restricted charitable gifts is that it appears to prove
too much in the context of publicly solicited gifts for restricted
charitable purposes. Professor Atkinson anticipated this objection in
its broad form, and elegantly articulated it as follows:
If moral force and the other extralegal enforcement mechanisms
previously described would in fact ensure that donors' wishes are
heeded, then has my argument proved too much? If donors' wishes
will invariably be obeyed without legal enforcement, removal of
legal recourse would not only do no harm; it would also do no
good. 178

Professor Atkinson answers this objection by arguing that the
breaking of commitments is often morally justified, and that enforcing
commitments that have lost their moral force is generally not terribly
important to donors. 179 He argues that in three contexts likely to arise
in the case of restricted gifts, commitments have little moral force,
with the result that donors who witness the breaking of such
commitments should not be deterred from giving to the charitable
donee in the future.'... First, commitments are less morally compelling
if they are not actively sought by the charitable donee."' Second,
dishonoring restrictions imposed by the dead is less morally troubling
than dishonoring restrictions imposed by the living.1 2 Third, the
moral force of commitments often decreases with the passage of
time. 8 3 What is striking about ProfessorAtkinson's three situations is
that they have very little application in the context of publicly solicited
restricted gifts. The first situation does not apply, for by definition, a
donee who has publicly solicited funds for a restricted purpose has
actively bargained for such gifts. The second situation is unlikely to
apply, because those who respond to a charitable donee's plea for
donations to meet a specific, current need are usually living. The third
situation may arise in this context, but only when the donee is
soliciting funds for a long-term charitable project. In many cases,
public appeals for funds have immediate charitable uses as their
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Atkinson, supra note 163, at 1130.
See id. at 1130-31.
See id. at 1131-33.
See id. at 1131.
Seeid. at 1131-32.
See id. at 1132-33.
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objects. Accordingly, in the case of publicly solicited restricted gifts,
Atkinson's proposal may indeed prove too much unless one supplies
an answer not yet articulated by Professor Atkinson.'8 4
I do not mean to suggest that Professor Atkinson's proposal is
inherently weak because of its lack of compelling application to
publicly solicited gifts. Quite like other scholars,"8 Atkinson is
primarily concerned with addressing the problem of control by the
"dead hand."' 86 Academic focus on remedying the problem of "dead
hand control" by reforming the doctrine of cy pres is legitimate and
beneficial. However, just as the doctrine of cy pres applies somewhat
awkwardly to publicly solicited restricted gifts, so do the current
reform proposals inadequately resolve the difficult and unique
problems that surface in this context. Further innovation in the law is
needed in this realm in which control is manifested by numerous
"living hands." The next section of this article suggests one possible
reform.
III. A FEDERAL INCOME TAX SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
SURPLUS, RESTRICTED GIFS RECEIVED THROUGH PUBLIC
SOLICITATIONS

A. Criteriafor Reform
The previous section of this article discusses several advantages and
disadvantages of current cy pres reform proposals as applied to the
disposition of surplus funds generated through public solicitations for
restricted gifts. No single proposal appears to solve completely the
problems surfacing in this context. Indeed, no proposal even purports
to do so. In analyzing these proposals, the foregoing discussion has
highlighted several criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of any
184. The best response is probably one based on impracticability. If compliance
with the original terms of the restricted gifts becomes impracticable, honoring the
original commitment is less morally compelling. If donors witnessing the breaking of
the commitment by the charity can be persuaded that compliance with the restrictions
truly was impracticable, future giving should not be deterred. In such circumstances,
Professor Atkinson's argument would not "prove too much," for under current law, a
court (rather than donors) has the sole authority to decide the existence of
impracticability. The weakness with this response is its necessary assumption that
donors witnessing the breaking of the commitment by the charity can be persuaded
that compliance with the restrictions truly was impracticable, when donors realize that
they have little expedient means for critically assessing the claim of impracticability
asserted by a charitable donee. For the reasons discussed in the text, the probable
tendency of charities to reach biased determinations of impracticability will likely
breed skepticism in donors.
185. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 26, at 391 ("By employing the same temporal
limitations on dead hand control over charitable trusts, I propose bifurcating judicial
review and modification of charitable trusts.").
186. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 163, at 1115 (proposing to eliminate legal
enforcement of "dead hand control").
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proposal to address the problem of disposing of surplus, restricted
charitable funds raised through public appeals. These criteria suggest
several characteristics of the optimal proposal.
First, the proposal should not unduly discourage charitable giving
(and ideally would even promote it). Second, the proposal should not
compromise the integrity of the charitable contribution deduction
under Code section 170.
Third, the proposal should facilitate
deviation from the original purpose of publicly solicited restricted gifts
when necessary to prevent the donee from losing its exemption from
federal income taxation under the private benefit doctrine (or any
other doctrine, for that matter). Fourth, the proposal should promote
the flow of reliable information between donors and charitable
donees.
Fifth, the proposal should accomplish the foregoing
objectives with minimal costs to donors, donees, and the judiciary.
In the following subsection, I offer one approach for tackling the
issue presented. I do not presume that my proposal solves all of the
problems raised thus far in this article. But I do believe that it
represents an advance in current academic thought in the context of
publicly solicited restricted gifts, and satisfies the criteria for
evaluation better than does any other current reform proposal in this
specific context.
B.

ProposedAmendment to the Internal Revenue Code

I propose amending the United States Internal Revenue Code to
include new section 170(f)(11), as set forth in the Appendix to this
article. My proposed addition to the Code generally would disallow a
charitable contribution deduction for any contribution'
that is
restricted for one or more particular purposes of the donee
organization if the taxpayer reserves in any private person (including
herself) the right to receive (or otherwise control the disposition of)
her contribution (or any part of it) should the donee organization fail
to use the contribution for the restricted purposes. A contribution
would be considered "restricted" for particular purposes in either one
of two cases. The first case involves a taxpayer who has expressly
required the donee organization to use the contribution for one or
more particular purposes (e.g., the taxpayer executes a deed of gift
requiring that her donation be used to construct a new law center).
The second case is broader, and reaches all situations in which, under
all of the facts and circumstances, the donee organization has
represented or implied that it will use the contribution for one or
more particular purposes. Such facts and circumstances would include
statements made by the donee organization in soliciting or accepting
187. The general rule does not apply to any contribution that, when aggregated
with all other contributions made by the taxpayer to the donee within the same
taxable year, does not exceed a de minimis amount, to be determined by Congress.
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the contribution, such as representations that all donations designated
for a particular fund of the donee will be used for assisting victims of
recent mountain fires in the Western United States.
This general rule is designed first to meet the second criterion
identified above-maintaining the integrity of the charitable
contribution deduction for federal income tax purposes. No longer
would taxpayers be permitted to exact the cost of the time value of
money on the government on account of contributions that survived
the test of deductibility under the current Treasury regulations yet
later wind up back in the taxpayer's hands upon the occurrence of
some contingency that was once deemed remote. No longer would
courts expend time (a consideration under the fifth criterion for
reform identified above) trying to determine whether the probability
of the contingency giving rise to a reversion is not so remote as to be
negligible.
Under the general rule, if the taxpayer retains a
reversionary interest in the contribution, the deduction is denied-no
matter how "remote" the contingency triggering the reversion may be.
This conclusion holds whether the taxpayer's reversion is explicitly
reserved or instead arises by operation of law-such as when property
reverts to a donor under the cy pres doctrine because she lacked
general charitable intent when the gift was made.
What about the first criterion described above?
Would my
proposed amendment to the Code significantly curtail charitable
contributions? I doubt it. Under a special exception, a deduction that
otherwise would be disallowed under the general rule is actually still
available in the following limited circumstance: when the taxpayer
reserves the right to direct the disposition of the contribution (or any
part of it) to a "qualified entity" upon the failure of the donee
organization to use the contribution for the restricted purposes. A
qualified entity is essentially any entity that can receive deductible
contributions under Code section 170 and that has the same status as
the original charitable donee for purposes of applying that section's
special deduction ceilings.'88 A qualified entity also includes the
donee organization itself. Thus, the effect of the special exception is
to enable a taxpayer to retain the power to direct an alternative
charitable disposition of her donation (if the charitable donee
becomes unable to carry out the original purpose of the gift) with no
adverse federal income tax consequences."8 9 Further, there is no
188. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)-(F) (West 2001) (limiting the charitable
contribution deduction for transfers to specified classes of donees based upon the
taxpayer's "contribution base").
189. Some authorities suggest that a taxpayer who retains such a right is entitled to
a charitable contribution deduction under existing law. See, e.g., Barber v. Edwards,
130 F. Supp. 83, 86-87 (D. Ga. 1955) (holding that contributions to a family-controlled
charitable trust are deductible for federal income tax purposes); Rev. Rul. 68-417,
1968-2 C.B. 103 (holding that the retention of the power to change beneficiaries of a
charitable remainder unitrust does not defeat the deduction otherwise available).
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requirement that the qualified entity be named at the time of the
original gift. A taxpayer who has reserved the right to select an
alternate charitable use of her donation may do so well into the
future, when the original purposes of the gift are incapable of being
fulfilled. 9" I also would recommend enacting a companion
amendment to the Code providing that a charitable donee's transfer
to a qualified entity pursuant to a donor's exercise of her reserved
right will be deemed to have been made in furtherance of the donee's
tax-exempt purposes.
Allowing a taxpayer to retain such a right provides the taxpayer
with a substantial voice in the use of her donation. A taxpayer who
retains this right will have significant assurance that, even if her
original purpose for making the gift fails, she still may decide its
charitable use. How does this fact relate to the first criterion
identified above (the incentive to give)? The likely effect on the
incentive to give in a jurisdiction that follows the cy pres doctrine
depends upon whether the donor has general charitable intent. The
proposal could serve as a disincentive to give by those who have no
general charitable intent at the time of making the gift, but only if
such persons assume, at the time of initially making the gift, that, at the
time that the originalpurpose of the gift becomes impossible to fulfill,
they would rather recover the property than specify an alternative
charitable use. That those donors would so assume is not clear, for
even they may realize that as time progresses, they themselves (as
opposed to a court with cy pres powers) may decide that another
worthy charitable purpose has surfaced. Further, under existing
federal income tax law, a donor who lacks general charitable intent
may not deduct her contribution unless the probability of the
contingency giving rise to a return of her contribution is so remote as
to be negligible. As discussed above, this probability has been
interpreted to mean "a chance which persons generally would
disregard as so highly improbable that it might be ignored with
reasonable safety in undertaking a serious business transaction."' 9 '
Under this standard, a donor lacking general charitable intent who
lawfully deducts her contribution for federal income tax purposes may
not place a high value on her reversionary interest, for the probability
The proposed special exception clarifies that a deduction in such cases is appropriate
for federal income tax purposes. My proposal does not address the analogous issue of
whether the retention of such a right would render the gift incomplete for federal
transfer tax purposes.
190. Hence, a taxpayer who retains this right of disposition has rights analogous to
one who contributes to an advise and consult fund. The analogy is not perfect, of
course. A taxpayer under my proposal can direct charities on how to dispose of funds
not used for the original purposes of the gift.
191. Briggs v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 646, 656-57 (1980) (citing United States v. Dean,
224 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1955)), aff'd without published opinion, 665 F.2d 1051 (9th
Cir. 1981).
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that she may exercise it is so remote that it would be disregarded in a
business context. If such is the case under existing law, my proposal
would not likely serve as a major disincentive for charitable
contributions by any such donor.
The proposed amendment to the Code probably creates incentives
to give with respect to taxpayers who have general charitable intent.
Under the cy pres doctrine, upon the failure of the charitable
purposes of the gift, a court decides what to do with funds donated by
those having general charitable intent. But if a donor states how
donated property must be used upon the failure of the original
charitable purposes, the donor's terms are controlling.'9 2 Thus, when
a donor is concerned with how her gift will be used, her ability to
retain the right to redirect funds upon the failure of the original
purposes of the gift would likely increase her incentive to give in the
first instance. In other words, a donor with general charitable intent is
probably more inclined to give if she can identify precisely not only
the original restricted purposes of the gift, but also any subsequent use
of such gift should the original purposes fail.'93
Of course, under current law, a donor is free to "opt out" of cy pres
by specifying that she has the right to redirect her contribution if the
charitable purposes of the gift fail. How, then, does the proposed
amendment improve the status quo? The answer lies in the
substantiation requirements and safe harbors of my proposal. The
new statutory provision would permit a deduction for a contribution
that is restricted for one or more particular purposes of the donee
organization only if the taxpayer substantiates the contribution by one
or more contemporaneous written statements of the donee
organization that contain specified information. Such information
must suffice to establish the taxpayer's entitlement to a deduction for
the taxpayer's contribution under the proposed amendment. As a
general rule, the statement(s) of the charitable donee must contain the
following information: (1) The amount of cash contributed, or a
description of any property other than cash contributed; (2) A
statement that no deduction is allowed under federal income tax law
for a contribution that is restricted for one or more particular
purposes of the donee organization if the taxpayer reserves (expressly
or by operation of law) the right to receive, or direct the disposition
of, the contribution (or any part of it) upon the failure of the donee
organization to use the contribution for such purposes, unless the sole
192. See Scott, supra note 13, § 399.2.
193. A similar analysis applies in the case of donations made to donees subject to
the laws of a jurisdiction that does not apply cy pres. The proposed amendment
would encourage contracts of gift that eliminate the need to follow the default rule in
such jurisdictions (i.e., the rule of reversion in the event of a failed gift). The likely
effect on giving by donors in such jurisdictions depends upon their preferences. The
discussion in the text need not be repeated with respect to that point.
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persons that can receive the contribution are qualified entities; (3) A
statement that the donee organization will use the contribution for
one or more particular purposes of the donee organization, and a
good faith description of any such purposes; (4) A good faith
description of the circumstances (if any) under which the taxpayer's
contribution may or shall not be used exclusively for the restricted
purpose(s); (5) A description of any right that the taxpayer, with
notice to the donee organization, has expressly reserved to receive, or
direct the disposition of, the contribution (or any part of it) upon the
failure of the donee organization to use all or any portion of such
contribution for the restricted purpose(s), or a statement that the
donee has not received notice from the taxpayer of having expressly
reserved any such right; and (6) Whether the donee organization has
received from the taxpayer any contemporaneous written statement,
the terms of which are set forth in the suggested statutory
amendment.
A charitable organization that accommodates a taxpayer's
substantiation requirements under the statutory proposal can assist
the taxpayer in availing herself of several "safe harbors." These safe
harbors are designed to facilitate the flow of very useful information
from donee to donor. Under one safe harbor, a taxpayer will be
deemed to have satisfied the need to substantiate her contribution
with the charity's good faith description of circumstances under which
the taxpayer's contribution may not be used exclusively for the
restricted purpose(s) if the description sets forth the following
information: (1) A statement that the taxpayer's contribution may (or
shall) not be used exclusively for the designated restricted purpose(s)
if doing so becomes illegal, impossible, or impracticable; (2) A
statement of the person(s) or entity (such as a court, or the charitable
donee's board of trustees) whose reasonable determination of such
illegality, impossibility, or impracticability will suffice to alter the
purpose(s) for which the contribution may be used; and (3) A
statement of whether the reasonably foreseeable loss of the donee's
exemption from federal income taxation will constitute grounds for
altering the purpose(s) for which the contribution may be used. It is
important to emphasize that the statutory proposal does not
necessarily compel the statements set forth in the safe harbor. A
charitable donee can dispense with restricted funds in whatever lawful
manner it selects. However, one may expect that a typical charitable
donee will realize that the safe harbor helpfully prompts the donee to
disclose the circumstances that may prevent fulfillment of the original
restricted purposes of the gift in broad outline. Moreover, although
the first statement of the safe harbor merely mirrors the grounds for
applying the cy pres doctrine, the second two statements add
flexibility and clarity not present under current cy pres case law. The
second statement prompts the charitable donee to consider vesting in
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its board of trustees the contractual right to alter the purposes of the
gift if doing so becomes necessary for articulated reasons. Because
the solicitation materials in mass appeals for funds comprise the
"instrument" of gift, a charity that expressly reserves the right to alter
the restricted purposes of the gift in specified circumstances need not
petition a court in cy pres proceedings in order to do so. The third
statement of the safe harbor prompts charitable donees to expressly
think about the utility of naming the potential loss of federal income
tax exemption among the grounds for deviating from the restrictions
governing a gift.
Again, by expressly incorporating into the
"instrument" of gift a provision stating that the reasonably
foreseeable loss of federal income tax exemption constitutes grounds
for deviating from the original restrictions, a charitable donee has
added assurance that it will not be forced to choose between honoring
donor instructions and forfeiting its exemption (or petitioning a court
to avoid this catastrophe). This safe harbor therefore scores high
under the third criterion for reform identified above.
Under another safe harbor, a taxpayer is deemed not to have
reserved a disqualifying right with respect to her contribution if the
taxpayer acknowledges to the donee organization in a timely
delivered written statement her agreement that in no event will the
taxpayer (or her heirs, legatees, or assigns) be entitled to receive or
direct the disposition of her contribution (or any part of it) should the
donee fail to use the contribution for the restricted purposes. A
special rule provides that this written statement may take any form,
including a writing provided by the donee organization in which the
taxpayer manifests assent to the content of the agreement just
described. Thus, a charity which asks the taxpayer to "check the box"
on a form containing boilerplate language of the described agreement
would readily facilitate the taxpayer's compliance with this safe
harbor.
Similarly, under yet another safe harbor, a taxpayer is deemed to
satisfy the special rule permitting the reservation of a right to direct
the disposition of the contribution to any qualified entity if she
acknowledges to the donee organization in a timely delivered written
statement her agreement that the sole right reserved by the taxpayer,
with respect to all or any part of her contribution, is the right to direct
the disposition of the contribution (or any part of it) to a qualified
entity upon the failure of the donee to use the contribution for the
restricted purpose(s) of the gift. Once again, a special rule provides
that this written statement may take any form, including a writing
provided by the donee organization in which the taxpayer manifests
assent to the content of the agreement just described (such as a
"check the box" form containing boilerplate language of the
agreement).
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The substantiation requirements, coupled with the safe harbors,
should greatly facilitate both the flow and clarity of information
between donors and charitable donees, and the drafting of concise
contracts of gift between such parties, even in the context of publicly
solicited gifts. I believe that a major advantage of the statutory
substantiation requirements (and the related safe harbors) is the
following: although the ultimate burden to substantiate restricted
contributions rests with donors, charitable donees can be expected to
provide all of the necessary information to donors in order to ensure
their continued stream of tax-deductible donations. As between
donors as a class and charitable donees as a class, the latter are much
more efficient "drafters" of contractual terms governing publicly
restricted gifts, if for no other reason than there is one charitable
donee for every public appeal to hundreds, or even thousands, of
prospective donors. Moreover, the text of the statements required
under the proposed substantiation rules, as well as the statements
facilitated by the safe harbors, can be expected to serve as boilerplate
language that charities incorporate in the correspondence that they
already send donors in their solicitation materials and in their
acknowledgments described in current Code section 170(f)(8)(B). In
other words, by providing a sampling of sufficient communications,
the proposed amendment reduces the transaction costs to be incurred
by charitable donees.194 The substantiation requirements, coupled
with the safe harbors, provide an incentive for charitable donees to
convey necessary information and obtain contractual representations
from donors in an efficient manner that simply does not now occur
consistently and pervasively. Thus, the proposal seems to fare well
under the fourth criterion (promoting the flow of information) and
fifth criterion (accomplishing the goals of reform with minimal costs)
identified above.
Why, under current law, do charities not provide this type of
detailed information, and why do they not facilitate precise (yet
concise) agreements with donors, in the manner likely to occur under
the proposed amendment to the Code? One plausible explanation is
that many charities simply do not appreciate the quagmire of legal
issues raised by public appeals for funds. As this article demonstrates,
the relevant legal issues are obtuse, and perhaps non-intuitive.
Another explanation is that charities who must "start from scratch"
prefer not to incur the costs of investigating the law and drafting

194. Admittedly, charities will incur transition costs as they seek legal advice to
ensure that their communications will adequately serve donors for purposes of
meeting the new substantiation rules governing restricted contributions. In a short
time, however, one would expect charities to develop forms that comply with the
requirements for substantiation, and to use these forms repeatedly with little revision.
Once the forms are developed, there should be few marginal costs associated with my
proposal.
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solicitation materials that precisely define the rights of donors and
donees. Admittedly, a few charities may even prefer to keep donors
uninformed of the consequences of restricted gifts. Whatever the
explanation, the proposed amendment to the Code should greatly
improve the way that charitable donees and donors reach an
understanding of the consequences of restricted gifts, and would do so

fairly efficiently.
This increased flow of information between charitable donees

would likely prove beneficial in several respects. At a minimum, it
should instill greater donor confidence in the charitable sector.
Recent events following September 11 confirm that donors are likely
to lose confidence in charities when they feel they have been misled.1 95

My proposal should go far in encouraging open communication
concerning the use of donations made in response to public
solicitations for restricted funds. The likely improvement in donor
confidence should itself promote charitable giving (a positive result
under the first criterion for reform). 196 Moreover, as I have observed

elsewhere, the charitable sector would probably benefit in other
respects from greater accountability to donors.1 97 The information
that donors must obtain from charities under the substantiation
requirements should facilitate such accountability in general. More
particularly, the required disclosure concerning whether the donor has
retained the right to redirect her contribution (or any part of it) to a
qualified entity (if the original restricted purposes of the gift fail) will
tend to place some pressure on charities to provide this option to
donors, who under the proposal will be informed that they can reserve
that right without incurring adverse federal income tax
consequences.1 9'

195. David McLaughlin, chairman of the board of governors of the American Red
Cross, has confirmed this point by stating that the failure of the institution to subject
itself to public scrutiny would prevent it from securing the trust of the general public.
See Levine, supra note 5, at 28.
196. Cf Karst, supra note 15, at 434-35 (observing that some degree of regulation
should be welcomed by "[f]riends of private philanthropy," for the sustained viability
of the charitable sector depends upon public confidence that charities are operating
efficiently).
197. See Johnny Rex Buckles, The Case for the Taxpaying Good Samaritan:
Deducting Earmarked Transfers to Charity Under Federal Income Tax Law, Theory
and Policy, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1243, 1325-32 (2002). The American Red Cross has
begun to recognize this fact. See Red Cross Pitches to Get Specific; Ads to Clarify How
Money Will Be Spent, supra note 1.
198. My proposal does not directly impose disclosure requirements on charitable
donees, nor does it assess any fine on charitable donees who fail to supply information
to donors. Instead, following the model of existing Code section 170(f)(8), the
proposal places on taxpayers (donors) the burden of obtaining the required
statements from charitable donees. Further, my proposal contains an exception to the
substantiation requirements if the donee reports the necessary information on a
return filed with the IRS, as does Code section 170(f)(8)(D).
These and other
elements of my proposal are designed to enable it to survive scrutiny under judicial
precedent interpreting the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. For a
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Ultimately, my proposal should encourage efficient extra-judicial
resolution of how to dispose of surplus funds. Through the proposed
substantiation requirements and safe harbors, donors and donees
would be expected to enter into semi-standardized contracts of gift by
which they sketch the circumstances that justify a departure from the
original restrictions governing donations. Donees that desire to
maximize contributions from the public would, through a safe harbor,
be able to facilitate taxpayers' reservations of rights to designate
alternative charitable uses upon the failure of the original purposes.
Less frequently would donees need to resort to the courts in costly,
unpredictable cy pres proceedings. Donors and donees could simply
agree to alternative dispositions of funds once the original purposes
have failed. Because my proposal does not eliminate the legal
enforcement of restricted gifts, the looming oversight of charities by
the state attorneys general (and the threat of litigation to curb abuses
of the public trust) should help to minimize the dissemination of
misinformation to donors by donees with respect to the existence of
circumstances justifying a deviation from the original restrictions.
In short, my statutory proposal should help effectuate the goals of
the most prominent cy pres reformers by promoting efficiency in the
charitable sector through cost-effective, private agreements between
donors and donees.
IV. CONCLUSION

Under existing law, a charitable organization that publicly solicits
funds for a designated purpose generally must use such funds for the
purpose specified in the solicitation materials. Deviation from the
restricted purpose may be permitted in certain circumstances if the
governing jurisdiction recognizes the doctrine of cy pres. The doctrine
of cy pres, however, is not easily applied to surplus restricted gifts
raised through public appeals. Federal income tax law renders the
application of the doctrine of cy pres to publicly solicited surplus
funds especially complex. Current proposals to reform the doctrine of
cy pres do not adequately resolve, or even address, the legal problems
raised by publicly solicited surplus donations.
My solution to the problems created by publicly solicited surplus
contributions to charity is to amend the Internal Revenue Code by
enacting a new provision that limits the charitable contribution
deduction for contributions made for particular charitable purposes of
the donee. My proposed amendment denies a charitable contribution
deduction in most cases in which a taxpayer reserves rights (explicitly
sampling of the constitutional issues raised by the regulation of charitable solicitation,
see Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988). A comprehensive
constitutional justification of my proposed amendment is beyond the scope of this
article.
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or by operation of state law) in contributed sums. In addition, a
taxpayer otherwise entitled to a charitable contribution deduction
may not lawfully claim it unless she substantiates the contribution
with one or more statements of the donee organization that contain
prescribed information.
Although my proposal takes the form of an amendment to the
Internal Revenue Code, I do not believe that the proposal's viability
depends upon quantifying the revenue loss associated with the current
rules for deducting restricted charitable gifts that are subject to a
contingency. That a real federal income tax interest is served by the
proposal is sufficient to justify an amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code. Far more important than the proposal's revenue effect is its
likely effect on the way that charitable donees and donors will "do
business" in raising funds for a designated charitable purpose. The
probable effect of the proposed amendment is an efficient increase in
the exchange of information between donors and donees, and added
clarity in how surplus funds raised through public solicitations will be
directed. In essence, the proposal should encourage charitable donees
and donors to enter into gift agreements that largely avoid many legal
problems arising under the doctrine of cy pres. The proposal should
benefit donors, charitable donees, the courts and the public at large.
APPENDIX

ADDITION OF NEW INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTION 170(f)(11)
Sec. 170. CHARITABLE, ETC. CONTRIBUTIONS AND GIFTS.

(f) DISALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION IN CERTAIN CASES
AND SPECIAL RULES. (11) RESTRICTED CONTRIBUTIONS WITH RESERVED
RIGHTS. (A) IN GENERAL.No deduction shall be allowed under
subsection (a) for any contribution that is restricted for one or more
particular purposes of the donee organization if the taxpayer reserves
(expressly or by operation of law), in the taxpayer or any person other
than the donee organization, the right to receive, or direct the
disposition of, all or any portion of such contribution upon the failure
of the donee organization to use all or any portion of such
contribution for such purposes.
(B) EXCEPTION FOR CHARITABLE DISPOSITIONS.- No
deduction shall be disallowed under subparagraph (A) solely because
the taxpayer reserves, in the taxpayer or any other person, the right to
direct the disposition of all or any portion of such contribution to a
qualified entity upon the failure of the donee organization to use all or
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any portion of such contribution for such one or more purposes of the
donee organization for which the contribution is restricted. For
purposes of this subparagraph (B), a taxpayer's reservation of a right,
in the taxpayer or any other person, to direct the disposition of all or
any portion of such contribution to a qualified entity (i) shall include the right to restrict such contribution (or portion
thereof) for one or more particular purposes of such qualified entity,
and
(ii) shall include the right to direct the disposition of all or any
portion of such contribution to more than one qualified entity.
(C) SUBSTANTIATION REQUIREMENT.(i) IN GENERAL.- Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), a
deduction otherwise allowable under subsection (a) for a contribution
that is restricted for one or more particular purposes of the donee
organization shall not be allowed unless the taxpayer substantiates the
contribution by one or more contemporaneous written statements of
the donee organization that meet the requirements of clause (ii).
(ii) CONTENT OF WRITTEN STATEMENTS OF DONEE.The contemporaneous written statement or statements of the donee
organization shall meet the requirements of this clause if they
collectively set forth facts sufficient to establish the taxpayer's
entitlement to a deduction for the taxpayer's contribution under this
paragraph. Such facts shall include the following information:
(I) The amount of cash and a description (but not value) of any
property other than cash contributed,
(II) A statement that no deduction is allowed under Federal income
tax law for a contribution that is restricted for one or more particular
purposes of the donee organization if the taxpayer reserves (expressly
or by operation of law), in the taxpayer or any person other than the
donee organization, the right to receive, or direct the disposition of,
all or any portion of such contribution upon the failure of the donee
organization to use all or any portion of such contribution for such
purposes, unless the sole person or persons that can receive all or any
portion of such contribution satisfy the definition of a qualified entity
(as defined in section 170(f)(11)(C)(ii)),
(III) A statement that the donee organization will use the
contribution for one or more particular purposes of the donee
organization, and a good faith description of any such purposes,
(IV) A good faith description of the circumstances (if any) under
which the taxpayer's contribution may or shall not be used exclusively
for the purpose or purposes referred to in subclauses (1I) and (III),
(V) A description of any right that the taxpayer, with notice to the
donee organization, has expressly reserved, in the taxpayer or any
person other than the donee organization, to receive, or direct the
disposition of, all or any portion of such contribution upon the failure
of the donee organization to use all or any portion of such
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contribution for the purpose or purposes referred to in subclauses (II)
and (III), or a statement that the donee has not received notice from
the taxpayer of having expressly reserved any such right,
(VI) Whether the donee organization has received from the
taxpayer a contemporaneous written statement described in
paragraph (H)(i)(I), and
(VII) Whether the donee organization has received from the
taxpayer a contemporaneous written statement described in
paragraph (H)(ii)(I).
(iii) CONTENT OF GOOD FAITH DESCRIPTION OF
CIRCUMSTANCES.Any good faith description required by
paragraph (C)(ii)(IV) need not specify in detail every contingency
under which the taxpayer's contribution may or shall not be used
exclusively for the purpose or purposes referred to in subclauses (II)
and (III) of paragraph (C)(ii). Such good faith description will satisfy
the requirements of paragraph (C)(ii)(IV) if it contains the following
information:
(I) A statement that the taxpayer's contribution may or shall not be
used exclusively for the purpose or purposes referred to in subclauses
(II) and (III) of paragraph (C)(ii) if doing so becomes illegal,
impossible, or impracticable,
(II) A statement of the entity, person or persons whose reasonable
determination of such illegality, impossibility, or impracticability shall
suffice to alter the purpose or purposes for which such contribution
may be used, and
(III) A statement of whether the reasonably foreseeable loss of the
donee's exemption from federal income taxation shall be sufficient
grounds for altering the purpose or purposes for which such
contribution may be used.
(iv) COORDINATION WITH SECTION 170(f)(8) AND
SECTION 6115.- The information specified in clause (ii) may
appear in any contemporaneous written statement or statements of
the donee organization, including (but not limited to) a
contemporaneous written acknowledgment described in section
170(f)(8)(A) and a written statement described in section 6115(a).
(v)
SUBSTANTIATION
NOT
REQUIRED
FOR
CONTRIBUTIONS
REPORTED
BY
THE
DONEE
ORGANIZATION.- Clause (i) shall not apply to a contribution if
the donee organization files a return, on such form and in accordance
with such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, which includes
the information specified in clause (ii) with respect to the
contribution.
(D) RESTRICTED PURPOSES.- For purposes of this paragraph,
a contribution is "restricted for one or more particular purposes of the
donee organization" if
(i) the taxpayer has expressly required the donee organization to
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use the contribution for one or more particular purposes of the donee
organization, or
(ii) under all of the facts and circumstances (including, but not
limited to, statements made by the donee organization in soliciting or
accepting such contribution), the donee organization has represented
or implied that it will use the contribution for one or more particular
purposes of the donee organization (other than such purpose or
purposes as the donee may unilaterally select after accepting the
contribution).
(E) QUALIFIED ENTITY.- For purposes of this paragraph, a
"qualified entity" is any entity described by the same subparagraph of
section 170(b)(1) as is the donee organization. The term "qualified
entity" shall also include the donee organization.
(F) CONTEMPORANEOUS.- For purposes of this paragraph,
(i) written statements of the donee organization
are
"contemporaneous" if the taxpayer obtains them on or before the
earlier of the dates specified in section 170(f)(8)(C), and
(ii) any written statement from the taxpayer to the donee
organization is "contemporaneous" if the taxpayer delivers it to the
donee organization on or before the earlier of the dates specified in
section 170(f)(8)(C).
(G) CRITERIA FOR SUFFICIENCY OF FACTS THAT MUST
BE SUBSTANTIATED. (i) GENERAL RULE.- For purposes of paragraph (C)(ii), the
contemporaneous written statement or statements of the donee
organization shall be deemed collectively to set forth facts sufficient to
establish the taxpayer's entitlement to a deduction under this
paragraph if such facts, considered under all relevant law, would
justify the claiming of a deduction under this paragraph, assuming all
other requirements of a deduction under section 170 have been
satisfied.
(ii) SPECIAL RULE FOR RELINQUISHMENT OF RIGHTS.Notwithstanding clause (i) of this subparagraph and paragraph (C)(i)
and (ii), the contemporaneous written statement or statements of the
donee organization shall be deemed collectively to set forth facts
sufficient to establish the taxpayer's entitlement to a deduction under
this paragraph if they (I) set forth the information required by subclauses (I) through (V)
of section 170(f)(11)(C)(ii), and
(II) acknowledge that the taxpayer has delivered to the donee
organization a contemporaneous written statement described in
paragraph (H)(i),
assuming all other requirements of a deduction under section 170
have been satisfied.
(iii) SPECIAL RULE FOR RESERVATION OF RIGHT
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SOLELY
TO
DESIGNATE
QUALIFIED
ENTITIES.Notwithstanding clause (i) of this subparagraph and paragraph (C)(i)
and (ii), the contemporaneous written statement or statements of the
donee organization shall be deemed collectively to set forth facts
sufficient to establish the taxpayer's entitlement to a deduction under
this paragraph if they (I) set forth the information required by subclauses (I) through (V)
of section 170(f)(11)(C)(ii), and
(II) acknowledge that the taxpayer has delivered to the donee
organization a contemporaneous written statement described in
paragraph (H)(ii),
assuming all other requirements of a deduction under section 170
have been satisfied.
(H) SPECIAL RULES.(i) SPECIAL RULES IN THE CASE OF RELINQUISHED
RIGHTS. (I) For purposes of this paragraph, a taxpayer shall be deemed not
to have reserved, in the taxpayer or any person other than the donee
organization, the right to receive, or direct the disposition of, any
portion of a contribution restricted for one or more particular
purposes of the donee organization, if the taxpayer acknowledges to
the donee organization in a contemporaneous written statement
delivered to the donee organization the taxpayer's agreement that in
no event shall the taxpayer or the taxpayer's heirs, legatees, or assigns
be entitled to receive or direct the disposition of all or any part of such
contribution upon the failure of the donee organization to use all or
any portion of such contribution for such purposes.
(II) A written statement described in subclause (I) need not take
any particular form, and may consist of a writing provided by the
donee organization in which the taxpayer manifests assent to the
content of the agreement described in subclause (I).
(ii) SPECIAL RULE IN THE CASE OF RESERVED RIGHTS
TO DESIGNATE QUALIFIED ENTITIES. (I) For purposes of this paragraph, a taxpayer shall be deemed to
have satisfied the requirements of paragraph (B) if the taxpayer
acknowledges to the donee organization in a contemporaneous
written statement delivered to the donee organization the taxpayer's
agreement that the sole right reserved by the taxpayer, in the taxpayer
or any other person, with respect to all or any part of the taxpayer's
contribution, is the right to direct the disposition of all or any portion
of such contribution to a qualified entity upon the failure of the donee
organization to use all or any portion of such contribution for the
purposes for which the contribution is restricted.
(II) A written statement described in subclause (I) need not take
any particular form, and may consist of a writing provided by the
donee organization in which the taxpayer manifests assent to the
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content of the agreement described in subclause (I).
(iii) SECTION NOT TO APPLY TO DE MINIMIS
CONTRIBUTIONS.This paragraph shall not apply to any
contribution which, when aggregated with all other contributions
made by the taxpayer to the donee organization within the same
taxable year, does not exceed [$XX].

